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ABSTRACT 
  In this Article, we revisit the clash between private law and the First 
Amendment in the Supreme Court’s recent case, Snyder v. Phelps, 
using a private-law lens. We are scholars who write about private law 
as individual justice, a perspective that has been lost in recent years 
but is currently enjoying something of a revival. 
  Our argument is that the Supreme Court’s theory of private law 
has led it down a path that has distorted its doctrine in several areas, 
including the First Amendment–tort clash in Snyder. In areas that 
range from punitive damages to preemption, the Supreme Court has 
adopted a particular and dominant, but highly contested, theory of 
private law. It is the theory that private law is not private at all; it is 
part and parcel of government regulation, or “public law in disguise.” 
  Part I is a brief overview of how that jurisprudential view came to 
be, as well as a sketch of a competing view of private law as individual 
justice. In Part II, we briefly trace the development of the doctrine 
surrounding the tension between the First Amendment and private 
law, particularly tort law, and how it helps lead to the view of private 
law as government regulation displayed in Snyder. We also point out 
how the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort, the main 
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claim at issue in Snyder, is a particularly poor vehicle for the Court’s 
theory of private law. A relatively recent tort, it was developed by 
scholars and judges as a means of redress for plaintiffs who had been 
wronged, but were left without a remedy. 
  Part III presents the central claims of the Article. We argue that the 
conception of private law as government regulation in Snyder arises 
from a combination of (1) the doctrinal tools that judges use in First 
Amendment cases, (2) the unitary nature of the state-action doctrine, 
and (3) the influence of instrumentalism, specifically in obscuring the 
plaintiff’s agency and the state interest in redress, and in privileging a 
particular view of compensation. In Part IV, we present some 
normative or prescriptive implications of our analysis, and then 
conclude. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Snyder v. Phelps1 was the blockbuster case of the Supreme 
Court’s October 2010 Term, and for good reason. It had vivid facts: 
the father of a slain Marine sued protesters from a church whose 
mission was to disrupt funerals of soldiers around the country in 
order to spread their message of the dangers of homosexuality.2 It 
featured the sexiest amendment in the Bill of Rights—the First—and 
perhaps the central principle in American political culture: freedom of 
speech. But with all of the First Amendment hype, less noticed was 
the underlying nature of the lawsuit itself, which had nothing to do 
with freedom of speech. It was the kind of lawsuit brought every day 
in courts around the country: a private party files a complaint, 
demands an answer, and alleges that the defendant has wronged him. 
When the case went to trial, the particular claims that went to the 
jury were for intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion 
of privacy: common-law torts.3 Snyder was, fundamentally, about 
private law. And it wasn’t just media coverage and commentators that 
missed this point: the Supreme Court itself failed to appreciate the 
private-law nature of the case. 
In this Article, we approach the tension in Snyder between 
private law and the First Amendment through the lens of private law 
as individual justice.4 When invoking the term “private law,” we do 
not mean to suggest that certain areas of law are pre-political, or exist 
somehow apart from the state. We simply mean to refer to common-
law subjects like torts, contract, and property (and their statutory 
counterparts) that involve primary rights by individuals that can be 
 
 1. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 1213. 
 3. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 
2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). A claim of civil conspiracy—based on the two tort claims—
also went to the jury. Id.  
 4. See generally, e.g., Nathan B. Oman, The Honor of Private Law, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
31 (2011); Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1765 
(2009) [hereinafter Solomon, Equal Accountability]; Jason M. Solomon, Judging Plaintiffs, 60 
VAND. L. REV. 1749 (2007) [hereinafter Solomon, Judging Plaintiffs].  
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enforced by the rights-holders themselves against other individuals 
and entities.5 
We argue that the Supreme Court’s theory of private law—one 
that follows the dominant view of private law as a species of 
government regulation—has distorted its decisions in several areas, 
including the First Amendment–tort clash in Snyder. 
Much of the Court’s approach to “speech torts” like defamation, 
invasion of privacy, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress 
tort at issue in Snyder can be explained by the particular 
circumstances in which the Court has interpreted the First 
Amendment in modern cases. Before New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan6 in 1964, the Supreme Court had not applied the First 
Amendment to state common-law actions.7 But Sullivan was a 
uniquely appropriate vehicle for doing so. After all, cases in which 
government officials seek to suppress criticism lie at the core of 
virtually any theory of free speech.8 In Sullivan, as we discuss, this is 
clearly what the ostensibly private lawsuit was intended to do. 
From the inception of the tort-versus-First Amendment doctrine, 
therefore, the Court treated private law as a tool used by government 
to suppress and punish speech.9 The fact that the cases decided 
immediately after Sullivan involved public figures surely contributed 
to this trend.10 By the time the Court decided Snyder, nearly fifty 
years later, the assumption that tort law served to suppress speech 
had become so pervasive that it scarcely needed to be articulated, and 
even an action by a private individual who was in no sense a 
 
 5. See John C.P. Goldberg, Symposium, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640 (2012) (referring to private law as that which “defines the rights and 
duties of individuals and private entities as they relate to one another”). 
 6. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 7. Id. at 299–300 & n.3 (Goldberg, J., concurring in the result) (pointing out that the 
Court was “writing upon a clean slate”). But see Eugene Volokh, Tort Liability and the Original 
Meaning of the Freedom of Speech, Press, and Petition, 96 IOWA L. REV. 249, 250 (2010) 
(arguing that “constitutional constraints on speech-based civil liability have deep roots”). 
 8. See Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 918 
(2010) (noting that the First Amendment was “designed to serve a quite limited purpose in 
preventing government suppression” of speech). 
 9. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (“Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, 
breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulae for 
the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no 
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that 
satisfy the First Amendment.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 10. See, e.g., Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 
U.S. 75, 77 (1966).  
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government official or public figure11 was conceptualized as an 
attempt to suppress offensive speech rather than an action seeking 
private redress.12 
To understand why the Supreme Court currently holds this view 
of private law as a form of state regulation, it is necessary to look 
beyond the development of First Amendment doctrine. A widely held 
view of private law that has taken hold during the course of the 
twentieth century has influenced the Court’s approach to tort law. 
What follows in Part I is a brief overview of how that view came to 
be, as well as a sketch of a competing view. 
In Part II, we briefly trace the doctrine navigating the tension 
between the First Amendment and tort law, showing how the Court’s 
decisions have led to the view of private law as government 
regulation displayed in Snyder. We also point out how the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress tort, the main claim at issue in Snyder, 
is a particularly odd vehicle for the Court’s theory of private law. The 
tort was developed by scholars and judges as a means of redress for 
plaintiffs who had been wronged, but were left without a remedy. 
Seen in this context, intentional infliction and Snyder fall squarely in 
the wrongs-and-redress conception of private law. 
Part III presents the central claims of the Article. We argue that 
the conception of private law as government regulation in Snyder 
arises from a combination of (1) the doctrinal tools that judges use in 
First Amendment cases, (2) the unitary nature of the state-action 
doctrine, and (3) the influence of instrumentalism, specifically in 
obscuring the plaintiff’s agency and the state interest in redress, and 
in privileging a particular view of compensation.13 In Part IV, we 
 
 11. Doctrinally the Supreme Court treats public figures and government officials the same 
in the context of defamation. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (“[T]he 
communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public officials and public 
figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory 
falsehood concerning them. . . . [P]rivate individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than 
public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery.”). 
 12. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (arguing that the outrageousness 
standard for speech in the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort carries a high risk that 
the jury will become an instrument for “suppression of . . . expression” (quoting Bose Corp. v. 
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 13. Benjamin Zipursky has pointed to this last factor as one that has led the Supreme 
Court astray in the areas of punitive damages and preemption. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 Harvard Law Review 1757, 1760, 1770–71 
(2012) (arguing that “[i]f scholars, lawyers, or judges insist on treating the common law of torts 
as simply a form of public law that delegates enforcement to individual plaintiffs, they will be 
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present some normative implications of our analysis. First, we 
conclude that—in a way that it did not in Snyder—the Court should 
find ways of protecting First Amendment values by containing the 
right to civil recourse rather than cutting it off altogether. Second, the 
Court should be more attentive to the nature of state involvement in 
litigation and the importance of the state’s interest in providing 
private parties with a means of redress for private injuries. Finally, 
the Court should pay more attention to the identity of the plaintiff 
and the way that the litigation is being used. There is a difference 
between a government official seeking to quash criticism and a 
private individual seeking redress for a wrong in which he was 
uniquely victimized. 
I.  COMPETING THEORIES OF PRIVATE LAW 
A. Private Law as Government Regulation 
Modern thinking about private law began on January 8, 1897. 
Picking such dates is always arbitrary, of course, but this day’s claim is 
at least as good as any other. On that date, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr. gave a lecture at Boston University Law School, later published in 
the nascent Harvard Law Review as “The Path of the Law.”14 
Holmes’s lecture came at a moment of tremendous creativity in 
private law. The decades after the Civil War saw the common law 
transformed by two pressures, one internal and one external. The 
internal pressure was the final collapse of the common-law writ 
system.15 As the old writs lost their grip on procedure and with it legal 
thought, it became necessary for judges and commentators to 
construct, for the first time, general bodies of doctrine governing tort 
and contract. This resulted in a huge burst of legal creativity as whole 
areas of the law were reimagined for the post-writ universe.16 
The external pressure came from the massive economic and 
industrial expansion witnessed in the United States in the years after 
 
doing torts with their eyes shut and stumbling at every turn,” and pointing to punitive damages 
and preemption as areas where the Supreme Court has made this mistake). 
 14. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).  
 15. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 8–12 
(1980) (describing the collapse of the writ system). 
 16. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 335 (2d ed. 1985) (“It 
is not hard to argue that American law between 1850 and 1900 underwent revolutionary 
change.”).  
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the Civil War.17 In part this was technological. Improvements in the 
efficiency of steam engines dropped freight costs by sea and by rail.18 
Instant, long-distance communication became widely available via 
telegraph and then telephone. Industrialization, especially increased 
mechanization, dramatically decreased production costs, creating the 
first truly national and international markets for manufactured goods, 
especially consumer goods.19 All of these economic developments, in 
turn, required private law to grapple with whole new categories of 
disputes, such as industrial accidents and complex corporate 
contracts.20 
Holmes thus wrote at a moment when private law in the United 
States was in profound doctrinal and intellectual upheaval, adapting 
itself to a radically new environment. In this context, Holmes 
provided a bracing new vision of the law, one based on a hardheaded 
functionalism and a strong distaste for moralizing jurisprudence.21 
Rather than understanding the law in terms of some internal logic or 
the underlying structure of moral obligations, Holmes insisted on 
viewing the law purely in terms of a system of incentives.22 
This emphasis on law’s functional reality, in turn, required that 
one think of law in terms of social aggregates and public policies. 
Having banished the language of morality from the law as so much 
sentimentality, Holmes offered a vision in which legal outcomes were 
 
 17. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: 
ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 11 (2000) (alluding to the “rapid and tumultuous changes” during the late 
nineteenth century that resulted in the transformation of the United States from a “rural, 
agricultural, and decentralized society into an urbanized and industrialized nation in the process 
of centralizing”). 
 18. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 1 (2001) (noting that the 
“sweeping changes in American economic life” were driven by “developments in the field of 
transportation”). 
 19. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Design of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design 
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1544 (1973) (discussing the 
“rapid growth of technology in consumer products” that led to the first set of tort claims 
involving such products at the beginning of the twentieth century).  
 20. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992). 
 21. See Holmes, supra note 14, at 461 (“It does not matter . . . whether the act to which it is 
attached is described in terms of praise or in terms of blame, or whether the law purports to 
prohibit it or to allow it.”). 
 22. See id. at 459 (“If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a 
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to 
predict . . . .”). 
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to be justified purely in terms of social utility.23 On this point it is 
striking that Holmes, surely one of the most sophisticated legal 
thinkers of his time, turned away from the most complex body of 
interdisciplinary work on law at the close of the nineteenth century, 
namely history. “It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of 
law than so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV,” he wrote.24 
History, Holmes conceded, is necessary to expose the reality of law. 
However, he went on: 
  When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in 
the daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is 
his strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next is 
either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal. For 
the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of 
the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the 
master of economics.25 
In short, according to Holmes, private law should be divorced from 
noninstrumentalist moral philosophy, studied as a mechanism for 
social control through incentives and organized to advance particular 
social goods.26 
The century of private-law thinking since the publication of “The 
Path of the Law” can be usefully understood as an attempt to tame 
the dragon exposed by Holmes—the unruly historical accident that is 
the common law—and render the dragon useful. Above all else, 
usefulness has been understood in terms of enlightened regulation.27 
Writing a generation after Holmes, for example, Felix Cohen, a 
leading legal realist, dismissed traditional legal reasoning as so much 
 
 23. See id. at 467 (“I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize 
their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage.”). 
 24. Id. at 469. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 23 (1996) (describing the instrumentalist perspective as 
emphasizing “private law’s reflexive qualities as a mirror and facilitator of basic social processes, 
most importantly capitalist development”). 
 27. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, 
Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 167 (2006) 
(defining the “instrumentalist thesis” as “the proposition that the outputs of legal decision-
making processes (paradigmatically, appellate adjudication) are, and should be, determined by 
extralegal considerations—that is, by (extralegal) considerations of policy or principle” 
(emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)). 
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“transcendental nonsense.”28 Legal realists like Cohen were 
profoundly skeptical of the reasons traditionally given by common-
law judges in support of their decisions and, like Holmes, longed for a 
legal discourse that would focus on the public policies at stake rather 
than obfuscating issues with the language of legal doctrine or 
individual moral responsibility.29 
Although private-law scholarship has fractured in many 
directions since the time of the legal realists, by and large it has 
accepted the realists’ basic rules of discussion. Rather than looking to 
the structure of legal doctrine for normative inspiration, the theorist 
should treat judicial rhetoric with suspicion.30 The virtuous judge is 
one who refuses to hide behind legal rules and forthrightly takes 
policy choices and consequences into account.31 Private law in 
particular should not be understood as resolving private disputes but 
rather as a mechanism for public regulation.32 To be sure, there has 
been a range of opinions as to what constitutes desirable public 
 
 28. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. 
REV. 809, 811 (1935). The attempt to understand legal arguments in terms of the structure of 
legal concepts and their underlying normative logic, he insisted, was the equivalent of engaging 
in a meaningless scholastic debate over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Id. at 
810. The panacea to our jurisprudential ills, Cohen insisted, was “the functional approach.” Id. 
at 822. Legal doctrine should be specified in terms of social aggregates and the effect of legal 
rules on social outcomes. See id. at 812 (“[S]ocial forces . . . mold the law and the social ideals by 
which the law is to be judged.”). 
 29. The work of the prominent legal-realist tort scholar Leon Green is a good example of 
this. Green’s torts casebook took a functional approach to considering the implications of 
various doctrinal choices for public policy. See WHITE, supra note 15, at 77 (discussing LEON 
GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORTS CASES (1931)). 
 30. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. 
REV. 431, 450 (1930) (suggesting that “one lifts an eye canny and skeptical as to whether judicial 
behavior is in fact what the . . . rule purports (implicitly) to state”); see also Thomas C. Grey, 
Judicial Review and Legal Pragmatism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 473, 476 (2003) (“[Reformist 
American legal thinkers] created a single impressive and threatening bogeyman, Holmes’s 
fallacy of logical formalism, Pound’s ‘mechanical jurisprudence,’ Cardozo’s ‘demon of 
formalism,’ and Felix Cohen’s ‘transcendental nonsense.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Roscoe 
Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 passim (1908); BENJAMIN N. 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (1921); and Cohen, supra note 28, 
passim)).  
 31. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF 
LAW 231 (2006) (associating this view of judging with both pragmatists like Judge Richard 
Posner and purposivists like Justice Stephen Breyer).  
 32. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 391 (1995) (“‘The final cause of 
law’ . . . is the welfare of society.’ . . . Legal rules should be viewed in instrumental terms.” 
(quoting CARDOZO, supra note 30, at 66)) (internal quotation mark omitted).  
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regulation, but all sides have agreed that this is what private-law 
categories such as tort and contract are doing.33 
On this view, tort law should be seen in terms of safety 
regulation and social insurance. A primary purpose of making 
tortfeasors liable is to police their conduct by imposing fines on 
certain undesirable activities.34 The modern law-and-economics 
movement has pursued this basic approach with the greatest tenacity 
and rigor. Money damages, on this view, force actors to fully 
internalize the cost of their own decisions, pushing them toward 
optimal levels of investment in precautions and the like.35 Even those 
who have not adopted the law-and-economics framework continue to 
see tort law in terms of shifting losses from plaintiffs to defendants in 
order to achieve distributionally desirable outcomes by, for example, 
transforming corporate actors into insurers for those that they harm.36 
In either case, the law is a way of regulating conduct so as to achieve 
particular social outcomes. 
In short, despite the diversity of modern thinking on torts and 
contracts, virtually all commentators assume that private law is a form 
of public regulation.37 Writing more than one thousand years ago, 
Tribonian opened the Institutes38 by writing, “There are two aspects of 
the subject: public and private. Public law is concerned with the 
organization of the Roman state, while private law is about the well-
being of individuals.”39 For much of Western legal history this 
distinction was taken as basic.40 The century of legal thought since 
Holmes, however, has made the distinction invisible if not 
 
 33. See, e.g., id. at 109–44; Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 passim (1976).  
 34. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 86 (2002) 
(describing this as one way tort liability may affect well-being under a welfare-economics 
framework). 
 35. For the leading account of this view, see generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF 
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).  
 36. See Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of 
Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 219 (2000). 
 37. See TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 132 (“All [legal academics] construe law in 
fundamentally instrumental terms.”).  
 38. J. INST. (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1987) (533). 
 39. Id. at 1.1.4.  
 40. See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II: THE IMPACT OF THE 
PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 99 (2003) (noting “the 
massive classification and systematization of the rules of public and private law” in the wake of 
the Lutheran reformation).  
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incomprehensible.41 From Holmes’s “bad man” to the complex 
theories of incentives promulgated by the economically inspired 
thinking that dominates contemporary views about torts, private law 
is something that the state does to its citizens. It is ultimately 
regulatory in precisely the same way that Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) regulations or Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) rules are regulatory.42 
B. Private Law as Individual Justice 
In opposition to the instrumentalist paradigm of private law, an 
alternative view has arisen in the past few decades. It is a view that 
might be described as old-fashioned, though it prevailed before 
Holmesian thinking took over.43 It holds that private law is about 
individual justice. The rise of this view results from several trends. 
The first is a reaction to the dominance of instrumentalism in legal 
reasoning and legal theory, particularly utilitarianism and its main 
variant, law and economics.44 A second and related trend is the revival 
of formalism, or “neoformalism,” as a legitimate and desirable way of 
thinking about legal reasoning.45 A third trend is a revival of what 
 
 41. See Duncan Kennedy, comment, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1357 (1982) (arguing that one cannot take the “distinction 
seriously as a description, as an explanation, or as a justification of anything”); Gary Peller & 
Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. L.J. 779, 789 (2004) (stating 
the realist view that the public-private distinction was conceptually impossible, given the fact 
that “private” rights inevitably depend on the existence of state power to enforce them). But see 
Goldberg, Pragmatism and Private Law, supra note 5, at 1640–41 (resisting the idea that “all law 
is public law”); Christian Turner, Law’s Public/Private Structure, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1003, 
1008 (2012) (arguing that the distinction “provides a lens into the fundamental structure of legal 
culture,” and that a two-stage taxonomy mapping the public-private nature of law creation and 
prosecution describes some of the fundamental choices for any legal system). 
 42. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 
1625, 1641 (2002) (“[O]n the deterrence view, safety regulations issued by agencies such as 
OSHA or [the Environmental Protection Agency] are even closer relatives to tort than criminal 
laws: They set standards, backed by fines or other sanctions that, in theory, will deter socially 
undesirable conduct.”). 
 43. Solomon, Equal Accountability, supra note 4, at 1772. 
 44. See TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 1 (“An instrumental view of law—the idea that law 
is a means to an end—is taken for granted in the United States, almost a part of the air we 
breathe.”); see also supra note 26. 
 45. For a good overview of the “new formalism” or “neoformalism,” see Symposium, 
Formalism Revisited, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1999).  
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some have called “rights talk” in the legal academy and in legal 
practice.46 We briefly review each of these developments in turn. 
The rise of instrumentalism occurred over time, but by the 1960s 
and 1970s, its dominance in legal thinking was complete.47 It is not just 
that it was unfashionable to think about law in any other way. It was 
nearly impossible to be taken as a serious practitioner or academic 
when articulating a different view.48 Such complete paradigm shifts, as 
Thomas Kuhn and others have explained, inevitably lead to reactions 
and swings in the other direction.49  
Eventually, however, legal scholars from different vantages 
began to criticize instrumentalist thinking.50 Some of this movement 
came from those trained in philosophy, where a similar reaction to 
utilitarianism was taking place.51 Legal thinkers on the left thought 
that instrumentalist thinking, particularly in the hands of economists, 
 
 46. For a critique from the academy, see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE 
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 1–17 (1991) (taking stock of and critiquing this 
revival of “rights talk”). For an exposition and defense from leading judges, see generally 
Aharon Barak, Foreword, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 16 (2002); and William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: 
Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433 (1986). These judicial accounts are cited in 
Grey, supra note 30, at 480 n.24.  
 47. See TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 116 (concluding that by the 1970s, “[t]he view that 
law is in essence an instrument had won over the legal academy”); see also Solomon, Judging 
Plaintiffs, supra note 4, at 1754–55 (“Since the publication of Oliver Wendell Holmes’ The 
Common Law in 1881, the dominant perspective among scholars is that tort law can be justified 
on instrumental grounds . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 48. See Solum, supra note 27, at 167 (“Contemporary American legal thought accepted as 
an almost dogmatic truth that legal decisions are (and should be) made on instrumental 
grounds—shaping outcomes to serve normative concerns.”).  
 49. See Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639, 679–
81 (1990) (outlining four indicia that law is in a state of “Kuhnian crisis,” the fourth being “the 
proliferation of ‘schools’ or ‘movements’ within the academy that increasingly talk past one 
another: law and economics, law and literature, conventionalism, originalism, feminism, critical 
legal studies”). 
 50. For an example of such criticism in torts scholarship, see John C.P. Goldberg & 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1735–45 (1998), 
which argues for a reintroduction in legal thinking of duty concepts, alongside instrumentalist 
concerns. 
 51. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 232–38 (1977) (arguing that 
utilitarianism fails to provide equality); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 14, 26–27, 286–89 
(1971) (arguing that utilitarianism cannot give voice to concerns of fairness and individuality); 
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 50, at 1804 (“Although it continues to enjoy considerable 
popularity, utilitarianism was the subject of severe philosophical critique in the 1950s, ‘60s, and 
‘70s.”); Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, 
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 75, 93–118 (1973) (arguing that utilitarianism renders 
moral values unintelligible). See generally UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (Amartya Sen & 
Bernard Williams eds., 1982) (critiquing various forms of utilitarian thought).  
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failed to consider important factors such as fairness and social 
solidarity in assessing the impact of law.52 Still others worried that if 
law simply collapsed into public policy, then law would lose its 
essential character.53 Scholars and judges on the right thought that 
instrumentalist approaches to law allowed judges to sneak in their 
own policy preferences when deciding cases.54 
It was this final critique that gave rise to the neoformalists. For 
the neoformalists, deploying concepts and using deductive reasoning 
was not an empty exercise. It was an ineliminable part of legal 
reasoning.55 If the law was to have any predictability, and if limits on 
the discretion of judges and other legal decisionmakers were to be 
 
 52. See generally, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Something Important in Humanity, 37 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2002) (criticizing law-and-economics scholars Louis Kaplow and Steven 
Shavell for failing to account for fairness and justice while pursuing the promotion of human 
welfare). 
 53. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 50, at 1741 (arguing that the “Holmes-Prosser 
model” of judicial inquiry is undisciplined, leading to unhelpful, “arbitrary, indeterminate, and 
doctrinally unstable” decisions, and that “[i]n addition, as every torts professor knows, the 
reduction of negligence to policy analysis threatens to drain the analytic structure from torts”); 
see also Solomon, Equal Accountability, supra note 4, at 1758 (noting concerns that 
instrumentalism threatens to collapse law into public policy).  
 54. It was this concern that led judges and scholars such as Justice Antonin Scalia to call for 
a return to formalism. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The 
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“Long 
live formalism. It is what makes a government a government of laws and not of men.”); see also 
Michael C. Dorf, Foreword, The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26 (1998) 
(“For Justice Scalia, purposivism is indistinguishable from the common law method of case-by-
case development of the law, in which judges assess the policy implications of various proposed 
rules of law, constrained only loosely by analogies to prior cases.”); Earl M. Maltz, The Dark 
Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995, 996 (1985) (“The most obvious example of 
judicial influence on lawmaking is in the development of the common law. Although 
institutional constraints limit judicial action to some degree, the general policy preferences of 
judges will clearly have a strong effect on the content of common-law rules.”); Maimon 
Schwarzschild, Keeping It Private, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677, 687 (2007) (“The problem of 
judges as lawmakers in a democratic society is a familiar one. Judges are not readily answerable 
to the electorate. Hence, judicial lawmaking is in tension with democratic legitimacy, if not at 
odds with it.”). 
 55. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: 
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (“According to the formalists, 
judges apply the governing law to the facts of a case in a logical, mechanical, and deliberative 
way.”); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 
949, 956 (1988) (“In the formalist conception, law has a content that is not imported from 
without but elaborated from within.”). See generally Martin Stone, Formalism, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 166 (Jules Coleman & Scott 
Shapiro eds., 2002) (outlining the development of formalism and its relationship to deductive 
reasoning).  
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meaningful, then there had to be a check on judges simply 
implementing their own policy preferences. The formal mode of 
reasoning provided such a check. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, a revival in thinking about rights 
occurred. This revival pushed back against prior critiques that rights 
were simply convenient labels to be used to mask whatever policy 
preferences a litigant, scholar, or judge was asserting.56 Legal theorists 
such as Ronald Dworkin posited a meaningful role for rights in the 
context of judicial review.57 Although “rights talk” enjoyed its most 
significant revival in the area of public law or constitutional rights, the 
idea of private-law rights emerged again as well. There has been a 
renewed interest in the importance of private-law rights—indeed, in 
the very idea that there is a coherent set of concepts called private 
law—led by the work of philosophers like Jules Coleman58 and Ernest 
Weinrib in tort theory59 and by scholars like Charles Fried in contract 
theory.60 In both tort and contract theory, the philosophers have 
pushed back against the economists and argued that deploying ideas 
like rights, duties, fairness, and justice constitute a more accurate and 
better way to think about these areas of law.61 
Much of this writing has been under the umbrella of “corrective 
justice.”62 For corrective-justice theorists, private law’s unification of 
the victim and the wrongdoer has normative significance.63 The 
wrongdoer has breached a duty owed to the victim rather than to 
society at large, and so the wrongdoer now owes amends to the 
 
 56. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 50, at 1793–97 (describing a resurgence of rights-
based reasoning in order to further “highlight the oddity of the continued rejection of duty 
analysis in negligence scholarship”).  
 57. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 51, at xi, 142–43.  
 58. See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992). 
 59. See generally ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).  
 60. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981).  
 61. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 58, at 382 (“[T]he victim’s connection to his injurer is 
fundamental and analytic, not tenuous or contingent. Thus, even if the current structure of tort 
litigation is consistent with economic analysis, it is better understood as embodying some 
conception of corrective justice.”); WEINRIB, supra note 59, at 132–33 (“[E]conomic analysis 
makes the wrong kind of considerations the primary building blocks of its enterprise. At the 
core of this treatment of welfare lies a straightforward idea: welfare cannot supply the 
normative underpinning for private law because private law relationships are bipolar and 
welfare is not.”). 
 62. For a summary of the leading theories of corrective justice, see Solomon, Judging 
Plaintiffs, supra note 4, at 1759–60. 
 63. See id. at 1759 & n.52 (citing WEINRIB, supra note 59, at 56–83).  
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victim. The practice of corrective justice, for many such theorists, 
helps restore the normative equilibrium among individuals in a 
society.64 
We are also attracted to, and have written about, a relatively new 
theory of individual justice called civil recourse.65 Civil recourse takes 
as central components of private law that the plaintiff both decides 
whether to bring the case and prosecutes the case herself.66 Like 
corrective justice, civil recourse sees normative significance in the 
plaintiff bringing her claim directly against the defendant, as opposed 
to bringing a demand to the attention of the state, for example.67 And 
civil recourse sees torts specifically as a law of private wrongs, not as a 
vehicle for loss allocation or deterrence of risky activity.68 
The idea of private-law rights, though, is so closely associated 
with the Lochner doctrine that invoking such rights often invites 
skepticism from legal scholars.69 Lochner v. New York,70 of course, 
 
 64. See id. at 1784–87.  
 65. Civil-recourse theory was first introduced by Benjamin C. Zipursky in Rights, Wrongs, 
and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) [hereinafter Zipursky, Rights, 
Wrongs, and Recourse]. Shortly afterwards, John C.P. Goldberg and Zipursky addressed the 
theory in The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 50, which largely focused on the relationality of 
duty but also asserted that a relational-duty approach should go hand in hand with a civil-
recourse theory of tort law, id. at 1826. Professors Goldberg and Zipursky have extended this 
relationality-and-recourse approach in several joint articles since and have also developed civil-
recourse theory separately in, especially: John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort 
Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005); 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 718–21 (2003) 
[hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse]; and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 55, at 
623. 
 66. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 65, at 754 (“[C]orrective justice theory itself 
misses the true structure of tort law. Tort law is a system in which individuals are empowered to 
bring rights of actions against those who have committed torts—legal wrongs—against 
them . . . .”). 
 67. See Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 65, at 92 (“The justice in the 
enforcement of private law lies in recognizing in those who are aggrieved a right to recourse 
against those who wronged them. It does not lie in the justice of bringing about a state of affairs 
that is optimal from a social point of view, whether corrective, distributive, or economic 
considerations provide the criteria of optimality.”). 
 68. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
917, 972 (2010) (arguing that “a wrongs-based account of Torts connects elegantly to a plausible 
and appealing account of tort law’s place in our legal system”). 
 69. See Grey, supra note 30, at 476 (“Starting with Holmes in the 1890s, reformist 
American legal thinkers yoked the private law conceptualism of Langdell and his followers to 
the activist classical-liberal judicial review of the Lochner era.” (footnote omitted)). For a more 
positive view of Lochner, see generally DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: 
DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011).  
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was a case wherein the right of freedom of contract was used to strike 
down New York State’s regulation of bakery workers’ hours.71 
Professor Cass Sunstein and others critiqued the doctrine as 
enshrining a notion of common-law baselines that were somehow pre-
political and natural.72 This view was taken as gospel among legal 
elites, at least until recently.73 Indeed, even in Kelo v. City of New 
London,74 a case with very good facts for proponents of private-law 
rights, a 5–4 decision from the Supreme Court upheld the state 
interest in economic development against the right to private use of 
one’s property.75 Moreover, in an age of statutes,76 judges may think 
that legitimate state interests can only be found in legislative codes 
when they cannot be inferred from constitutional text. Looking for 
such rights in the common law might seem like praying to the 
“brooding omnipresence in the sky.”77 Finally, private law may have a 
discredited pedigree in the court simply because of its association 
with the evils of litigiousness.78 
 
 70. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 71. Id. at 64.  
 72. See HOWARD GILMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE FOUNDING VISION OF A 
FACTION-FREE REPUBLIC, THE INTENSIFICATION OF CLASS CONFLICT AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
IDEOLOGY DURING THE LOCHNER ERA 433 (1988) (claiming that the redirection of the Court’s 
role in the political system required justices to come up with a reliable method of “specifying 
those ‘natural’ rights and liberties that liberalism claims are possessed by all individuals”); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 875 (1987) (“Numerous decisions 
depend in whole or in part on common law baselines or understandings of inaction and 
neutrality that owe their origin to Lochner-like understandings.”).  
 73. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the 
Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2003) (“Among 
constitutional law professors, the most popular understanding of Lochner is Cass Sunstein’s 
view that the Court believed that common law rules were natural and immutable and therefore 
formed the appropriate baseline from which to judge the constitutionality of regulatory 
legislation. Legal historians, meanwhile, pay little heed to Sunstein’s rather impressionistic 
understanding of Lochner . . . . [A different] understanding of Lochner is gradually winning an 
increasing audience among mainstream constitutional scholars and threatens to eventually 
supplant Sunstein’s interpretation as the conventional understanding of Lochner among law 
professors.” (footnote omitted)).  
 74. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 75. Id. at 489–90; see also Richard A. Epstein, Supreme Folly, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2005, 
at A14 (“Last week’s regrettable 5–4 decision in Kelo v. City of New London marks a new low 
point in the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence.”). 
 76. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 
(1982). 
 77. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 78. See Jamal Greene, Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 325, 342 (2009) (“If any other theme has emerged from the votes of Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Alito, it is an apparent hostility to litigation—continuing the views of their 
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This then was the intellectual backdrop when the Supreme Court 
considered the clash between private law and the First Amendment 
during the October 2010 Term in Snyder. 
II.  SNYDER AND THE SPEECH TORTS: A WINDOW INTO THE 
SUPREME COURT’S THEORY OF PRIVATE LAW 
A. Snyder v. Phelps 
On Friday, March 3, 2006, Lance Corporal Matthew A. Snyder 
of the Combat Service Support Group-1, First Marine Logistics 
Group, First Marine Expeditionary Force, died in Iraq’s Anbar 
province when the Humvee in which he was riding overturned.79 He 
had been in Iraq for one month and had been a Marine for three 
years.80 He was twenty years old.81 Lance Corporal Snyder had grown 
up in the small Maryland town of Westminster and had only recently 
graduated from the local high school.82 Indeed, prior to shipping out 
to Iraq, the Marine Corps had sent Lance Corporal Snyder back as a 
recruiter to his high school.83 His death was a major event in the small 
town.84 School administrators announced it to the students and 
teachers at the high school, where David Brown, the assistant 
principal, had coached Lance Corporal Snyder as a six-year-old 
basketball player.85 His mother was too grief-stricken to speak with 
the media, deputizing her sister—Lance Corporal Snyder’s 
godmother—to act as her spokesperson.86 Al Snyder, his father, said, 
 
predecessors . . . .”); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as 
an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1181 (2006) 
(“[T]he Rehnquist Court consistently expressed little patience with lower courts that have 
attempted to carve out for themselves a broader role in resolving disputes and administering 
justice.”); Kenneth W. Starr, The Roberts Court at Age Three: A Response, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 
1015, 1025 (2008) (“[T]he Roberts Court, more than any Court in recent memory, is skeptical of 
the efficacy of large-scale civil litigation.”). 
 79. Nicole Fuller & Gina Davis, Carroll Co. Marine, 20, Killed in Iraq, BALT. SUN., Mar. 7, 
2006, at 1B; News at Five (ABC television broadcast Mar. 10, 2006) (transcript on file with the 
Duke Law Journal). 
 80. Fuller & Davis, supra note 79. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.  
 84. See generally, e.g., id.; News at Five, supra note 79; Ari Natter, Westminster Marine Dies 
in Iraq, CARROLL CNTY. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at 1A. 
 85. Fuller & Davis, supra note 79.  
 86. Id. 
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“He was a hero, and he was the love of my life.”87 A week later, the 
family held a funeral for Lance Corporal Snyder at their Catholic 
church.88 
In 1955, Fred Phelps founded the Westboro Baptist Church in 
Topeka, Kansas.89 The church describes itself as an “Old School (or, 
Primitive) Baptist Church” but is not associated with the Southern 
Baptist Convention or any other mainstream Baptist denomination.90 
Firmly believing in the Calvinist doctrines of total human depravity 
and limited atonement, the Westboro Baptist Church insists that 
there are many people that God despises and will refuse to save.91 The 
websites run by the church provide a litany of those to whom God’s 
grace will not extend and whom he accordingly hates: 
www.GodHatesFags.com, www.GodHatesIslam.com, www.GodHates 
TheMedia.com, www.GodHatesTheWorld.com, www.JewsKilled 
Jesus.com, www.BeastObama.com, www.PriestsRapeBoys.com, 
www.blogs.SpareNot.com, and www.AmericaisDoomed.com.92 Much 
of the church’s preaching focuses on homosexuality and the 
punishments that God has purportedly been raining down on 
America because of its tolerance toward homosexuals, including 
homosexuals in the military.93 Since 1991, the church claims to have 
conducted over 47,000 “sidewalk demonstrations” in which they have 
held aloft signs declaring “God Hates Fags,” “AIDS Cures Fags,” 
“Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Fag Troops,” and the like.94 
On March 10, 2006, members of the Westboro Baptist Church 
arrived in Westminster to protest Lance Corporal Snyder’s funeral.95 
They had previously contacted the local police, who informed them 
that they would have to conduct their protest one thousand feet from 
the chapel where the funeral was to be held.96 Protests by the church 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Gina Davis, At Carroll Funeral, a National Protest, BALT. SUN., Mar. 11, 2006, at 1A. 
 89. Westboro Baptist Church, About Us, GOD HATES FAGS http://www.godhatesfags.com/ 
wbcinfo/aboutwbc.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Westboro Baptist Church, Frequently Asked Questions, GOD HATES FAGS, 
http://www.godhatesfags.com/faq.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).  
 93. Id.  
 94. Westboro Baptist Church, supra note 89.  
 95. Davis, supra note 88; News at Five, supra note 79. 
 96. Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Rules for Anti-Gay Protesters at Funerals (National 
Public Radio broadcast Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://www.npr.org/2011/03/02/134194491/
high-court-rules-for-military-funeral-protesters. 
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had previously attracted the attention of veterans, who formed the 
Patriot Guard Riders, a motorcycle gang that converges on funerals 
targeted by the Westboro Baptist Church and forms a cordon of 
leather-clad, flag waving bikers to shield family members from the 
protesters.97 Bikers from up and down the East Coast converged on 
Lance Corporal Snyder’s funeral and ringed the edge of the parish 
church where the funeral was held.98 Not surprisingly, the event 
attracted media attention, leading the local television news broadcasts 
and making the front page of the Baltimore Sun.99 The Westboro 
Baptist Church subsequently published an extensive manifesto on its 
website defending the protests at the funeral and accusing the 
Snyders of raising their child to support child molestation in the 
Catholic Church, thus earning divine retribution.100 
The church’s protests had also attracted the attention of 
Maryland state legislators, who introduced a law designed to protect 
mourning families from protestors by making it a crime to protest in 
close proximity to funerals.101 This law, however, was prospective only 
and was thus aimed at controlling the behavior of future protestors.102 
It gave Lance Corporal Snyder’s parents no means of redress against 
those who had turned their son’s funeral into a national media event. 
Maryland’s common law of torts, however, did provide an 
avenue of redress. In 1977, the Maryland Supreme Court recognized 
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the case of 
 
 97. Davis, supra note 88. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See, e.g., id.; News at Five, supra note 79. 
 100. Westboro Baptist Church, Where Can I Find “The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. 
Matthew Synder” Epic??, WBC BLOGS: THE WORKMEN BLOG (Oct. 11, 2011), 
http://blogs.sparenot.com/workmen/2011/10/11/where-can-i-find-the-burden-of-marine-lance-
cpl-matthew-a-snyder-epic. 
 101. H.B. 850, 421st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2006) (codified as amended at MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-205 (LexisNexis 2012)). 
 102. Id. The law’s stated purpose is:  
[P]rohibiting a person from knowingly obstructing, hindering, impeding, or blocking 
another person’s entry to or exit from a burial, memorial service, funeral, or funeral 
procession under certain circumstances; prohibiting a person from addressing certain 
speech to a person attending a funeral, burial, memorial service, or funeral procession 
that is likely to incite or produce an imminent breach of the peace; prohibiting certain 
picketing; providing penalties for a violation of this Act; making the provisions of this 
Act severable; and generally relating to prohibiting certain speech likely to incite or 
produce an imminent breach of the peace and acts at burials, memorial services, 
funerals, or funeral processions under certain circumstances. 
H.B. 850. 
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Harris v. Jones.103 Building on case law from other jurisdictions, the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts,104 and academic commentary, the court 
crafted a tort designed to provide redress against “one who by 
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes 
severe emotional distress.”105 As examples of severe emotional 
distress, the court cited cases involving false allegations of child 
molestation and misconduct surrounding the death of a loved one.106 
On June 5, 2006, Al Snyder availed himself of this law and sued the 
Westboro Baptist Church protesters in federal district court in 
Maryland.107 
The jury eventually awarded Al Snyder $2.9 million in 
compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages, which the 
district court reduced to $2.1 million.108 Phelps appealed to the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that Maryland’s tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress violated the Free Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment.109 The Fourth Circuit agreed, and Snyder appealed 
to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.110 The 
Court upheld the Fourth Circuit’s decision.111 
B. Doctrinal Background—First Amendment Versus State Tort Law 
The majority opinion in Snyder by Chief Justice Roberts 
represents the culmination of a long series of cases in which the Court 
has considered the relationship between the First Amendment and 
state tort law. The Court’s jurisprudence in this area begins with 
Sullivan, a case that grew out of the Civil Rights movement and the 
struggle against segregation in Alabama.112 On March 29, 1960, the 
 
 103. See Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977) (holding that “the independent tort 
of infliction of emotional distress should be sanctioned in Maryland”).  
 104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).  
 105. Harris, 380 A.2d at 613 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 106. Id. at 613–14, 617.  
 107. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 
2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 108. Id. at 595, 597. 
 109. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 110. Snyder v. Phelps, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010).  
 111. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1221 (2011). 
 112. Mr. Sullivan, one of three Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama, 
brought his “action against the four individual petitioners, who are Negroes and Alabama 
clergymen, and against petitioner the New York Times Company.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964). 
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New York Times ran a paid advertisement in the form of an editorial 
entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices.”113 The editorial described events 
in Montgomery, Alabama related to the student protests against the 
continuing unwillingness of the state to comply with various 
desegregation orders.114 It was undisputed that the advertisement as 
published contained various false statements about the Montgomery 
police department.115 For example, it stated that police had “ringed” 
the university campus when, in fact, the police had only been 
stationed nearby, and it claimed that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. had 
been arrested seven times when, in fact, he had only been arrested 
four times.116 Sullivan, one of Montgomery’s elected police 
commissioners, sued the Times for libel and was awarded $500,000 in 
compensatory damages by an Alabama jury, although neither 
Sullivan nor the police commission was mentioned in the 
advertisement.117 
The Times appealed to the Supreme Court, which ruled that for 
a public official to prevail in a tort action based on critical speech he 
must not only show that the statement is false and was made with 
“actual malice,” but he must also prove these elements with 
“convincing clarity.”118 Strikingly, the Court’s opinion, authored by 
Justice Brennan, reveals a view that sees private law as essentially 
indistinguishable from other forms of government regulation. This 
can be seen, for example, in the Court’s rejection of Sullivan’s state-
action argument. The Court wrote: 
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama 
courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to 
 
 113. Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960, at L25.  
 114. See id. (“In [the students’ efforts] to uphold these guarantees [in the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights], they are being met by an unprecedented wave of terror by those who would 
deny and negate that document which the whole world looks upon as setting the pattern for 
modern freedom . . . .”). As the Court described the article, “[s]ucceeding paragraphs purported 
to illustrate the ‘wave of terror’ by describing certain alleged events.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256–
57.  
 115. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 258 (“It is uncontroverted that some of the statements 
contained in the two paragraphs were not accurate descriptions of the events which occurred in 
Montgomery.”).  
 116. Id. at 259. 
 117. Id. at 256, 258. 
 118. See id. at 285–86 (“[W]e consider that the proof presented to show actual malice lacks 
the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands . . . .”); id. at 287 (“The mere 
presence of the stories in the files does not, of course, establish that the Times ‘knew’ the 
advertisement was false . . . .”).  
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impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of 
speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a 
civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by 
statute.119 
Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court wrote disparagingly of attempts 
to draw distinctions between libel law and other forms of restrictions 
on speech as “mere labels of state law.”120 Hammering away at the 
equivalence between private law and other forms of government 
regulation, Justice Brennan wrote, “What a state may not 
constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise 
beyond the reach of its civil law of libel.”121 
The Constitution prohibits the suppression of political speech by 
the state. The Court’s key point was that, like the other attempts to 
suppress the speech that its opinion listed, the effect of libel damages 
was to penalize speech critical of public officials.122 As even critics of 
the Court’s decision have acknowledged, it was surely correct that 
“[w]hether or not a newspaper can survive a succession of [civil] 
judgments, the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who 
would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which the 
First Amendment freedoms cannot survive.”123 Hence, the Court 
focused on “a State’s power to award damages for libel,”124 seeing the 
purpose—or at any rate the effect—of libel law in terms of the 
suppression of libelous speech by the government.125 
 
 119. Id. at 265. The “state rule of law” to which the Court refers, id., is at sections 908 to 917 
of Title 7 of the Alabama Code. 
 120. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (“[W]e are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to 
give any more weight to the epithet ‘libel’ than we have to other ‘mere labels’ of state law.” 
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963))).  
 121. Id. at 277. 
 122. See id. at 269–70 (“Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of 
the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulae for the 
repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic 
immunity from constitutional limitations. . . . Thus, we consider this case against the background 
of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 123. Id. at 278; see also, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782, 790 (1986) (“Nonetheless the states cannot be allowed to define 
defamation as they please. If they could, they might expand the boundaries of the tort until it 
covers what, in strict theory, belongs within the domain of protected speech.”). 
 124. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283. 
 125. See id. at 278 (“Plainly the Alabama law of civil libel is ‘a form of regulation that 
creates hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than those that attend reliance upon 
the criminal law.’” (quoting Bantam Books, Inc., v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963))). But see id. 
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Given the context of Sullivan, it is unsurprising that the Court 
saw the libel action at issue in the case primarily in terms of the state’s 
effort to suppress critical speech.126 First, the case arose in the context 
of the largely unsuccessful attempt by the federal courts to force 
southern states to desegregate.127 Second, and related, given that the 
connection between the advertisement and Sullivan was tenuous at 
best, and that criticism by outside agitators (such as those who 
purchased the New York Times advertisement) likely enhanced—
rather than libeled—Sullivan’s political reputation, it is unsurprising 
that the Court saw the lawsuit mainly as an effort to muffle criticism 
of segregationist policies.128 There is every indication that speech 
suppression is exactly what the suit was intended to do.129 Indeed, 
though the majority opinion was coy on this point, the concurring 
opinion by Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, was more 
forthright. Justice Black wrote: 
One of the acute and highly emotional issues in this country arises 
out of efforts of many people, even including some public officials, 
to continue state-commanded segregation of races in the public 
schools and other public places, despite our several holdings that 
such a state practice is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Montgomery is one of the localities in which widespread hostility to 
desegregation has been manifested. This hostility has sometimes 
extended itself to persons who favor desegregation, particularly to 
so-called “outside agitators,” a term which can be made to fit papers 
like the Times, which is published in New York.130 
Given this background, it is easy to understand why the justices 
concluded, in the words of Justice Black’s concurrence, that “state 
 
at 281 (quoting a decision by the Kansas Supreme Court weighing the importance of public 
discussion against the “occasional injury to the reputations of individuals” (quoting Coleman v. 
MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 286 (Kan. 1908)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 126. See supra notes 119–122 and accompanying text.  
 127. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 42–54 (1991) (discussing the relative ineffectiveness of judicially mandated 
desegregation).  
 128. See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 151 (Vintage Books 1992) (1991) (“No doubt Justice Brennan and those who 
joined his opinion of the Court were also aware of those realities [about race and political 
incentives raised in Justice Black’s concurrence].”). 
 129. See id. at 42 (“Commissioner Sullivan’s real target was the role of the American press 
as an agent of democratic change. He and the other Southern officials who had sued the Times 
for libel were trying to choke off a process that was educating the country about the nature of 
racism and was affecting political attitudes on that issue.”). 
 130. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 294 (Black, J., concurring). 
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libel laws threaten the very existence of an American press virile 
enough to publish unpopular views on public affairs and bold enough 
to criticize the conduct of public officials.”131 The majority also 
displayed a distinct lack of trust in the Alabama courts, resolving the 
case on the merits before remanding it to the local court.132 Though 
the majority justified this action in the name of “effective judicial 
administration,”133 the procedural ploy makes it clear that the 
majority shared the concurrence’s belief that libel law was being used 
as a weapon to suppress critical speech.134 Indeed, one of the striking 
things about the Alabama law at issue in the case is that it was not the 
common law of libel but rather a statutory creation that, through a 
series of shifted presumptions, made it very easy for public officials to 
obtain libel judgments for any factually inaccurate statement, even if 
the errors were relatively trivial.135 
Nearly twenty-five years later, in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell,136 the Court extended its approach in Sullivan to cases 
involving the intentional infliction of emotional distress, holding that 
a public figure could not recover damages against the publisher of a 
parody that had otherwise satisfied the common-law requirements for 
the tort.137 The case involved a mock advertisement published by 
Larry Flint’s Hustler Magazine featuring a drunken and incestuous 
sexual encounter in an outhouse between conservative televangelist 
Jerry Falwell and his mother.138 In overturning Falwell’s damage 
award, the Court once again conceptualized damages as a form of 
“governmentally imposed sanctions.”139 According to the opinion by 
 
 131. Id.  
 132. See id. at 292 (majority opinion) (“The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama is 
reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceeding not inconsistent with this 
opinion.”).  
 133. Id. at 284. 
 134. See id. at 291–92 (discussing the “disquieting implications” of the Alabama court’s 
transformation of impersonal governmental criticism “into personal criticism, and hence 
potential libel, of the officials of whom the government is composed”).  
 135. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.  
 136. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 137. Id. at 50 (“Respondent would have us find that a State’s interest in protecting public 
figures from emotional distress is sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech that 
is patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury, even when that speech could not 
reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved. This 
we decline to do.”).  
 138. Id. at 47–48. 
 139. Id. at 51; see also id. at 50–51 (“‘[T]he freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an 
aspect of individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the common 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, the purpose of the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress is to impose a “sanction in the form of 
damages” and “prevent[] emotional harm.”140 Hence, the state interest 
to be balanced against First Amendment values was its ability to 
control its citizens’ behavior by suppressing a particular activity—
offensive speech—through a system of monetary punishments. 
This does not mean, however, that the Court’s modern First 
Amendment jurisprudence has always conceptualized state tort law in 
terms of government regulation and the suppression of speech. In 
Rosenblatt v. Baer,141 the Court considered who should be treated as a 
“public official” for purposes of Sullivan’s “actual malice” 
requirements.142 The Court entertained the possibility that the 
manager of a ski resort owned by a New Hampshire county was a 
“public official” and therefore faced the heightened requirements of 
New York Times.143 Writing for the Court, however, Justice Brennan 
emphasized, “This conclusion does not ignore the important social 
values which underlie the law of defamation. Society has a pervasive 
and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon 
reputation.”144 In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart was even 
more forceful: 
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from 
unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our 
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human 
being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. 
The protection of private personality, like the protection of life 
itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and 
Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean that the right is entitled 
to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional 
system. . . . The First and Fourteenth Amendments have not 
 
quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.’ We have therefore been particularly 
vigilant to ensure that individual expressions of ideas remain free from governmentally imposed 
sanctions.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union 
of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–04 (1984))).  
 140. Id. at 52–53. 
 141. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). 
 142. Id. at 77; see also id. at 86 (“Where a position in government has such apparent 
importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of 
the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and 
performance of all government employees, both elements we identified in New York Times are 
present and the New York Times malice standards apply.” (footnote omitted)).  
 143. Id. at 87. 
 144. Id. at 86 (emphasis added). 
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stripped private citizens of all means of redress for injuries inflicted 
upon them by careless liars.145 
Notice that both Justice Brennan and Justice Stewart 
conceptualize tort law as serving more than merely the state’s interest 
in preventing speech damaging to reputation. They also see the law as 
providing an avenue of redress for wronged plaintiffs. In other words, 
the law is not merely a mechanism for controlling the behavior of 
citizens. It also serves to empower private parties to act against those 
who have wronged them. Indeed, Justice Stewart suggested that the 
availability of this agency has its roots in the idea of “ordered liberty” 
and may be independently protected by the Constitution.146 
By 2011 and Snyder, however, the image of tort law as a 
mechanism for the regulation of speech was firmly entrenched in the 
Court’s jurisprudence.147 Strikingly, for an opinion declaring a well-
established common-law claim unconstitutional, Chief Justice 
Roberts’s majority opinion in Snyder does not even attempt to 
articulate a justification for state tort law, instead focusing the bulk of 
its discussion on the nature of Westboro’s speech.148 The opinion 
acknowledged the plaintiff’s deep emotional distress,149 but, if 
anything, this acknowledgment served to strengthen Phelps’s First 
Amendment claim.150 The acknowledgment did this by bolstering the 
majority opinion’s conceptualization of tort law as doing little more 
than seeking to punish and suppress distressing speech.151  
 
 145. Id. at 92–93 (Stewart, J., concurring).  
 146. Id. at 92. 
 147. Both sides’ briefs in Snyder reflect this point. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 19, Snyder 
v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (No. 09-751), 2010 WL 2145497, at *19 (“[T]he First 
Amendment protects speakers from tort liability only when there is a reasonable relationship 
between the ‘matter of public concern’ and the speech’s target.”); Brief for Respondents at 18, 
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (No. 09-751), 2010 WL 2826988, at *18 (“Hustler . . . requires that any 
speech on public matters that is targeted by the tort of [intentional infliction of emotional 
distress] must be shown false and uttered with actual malice.”).  
 148. See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1217 (“The fact that Westboro spoke in connection with a 
funeral, however, cannot by itself transform the nature of Westboro’s speech.”). 
 149. Id. at 1217–18. 
 150. See id. at 1219 (“The record confirms that any distress occasioned by Westboro’s 
picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the message conveyed, rather than any 
interference with the funeral itself. A group of parishioners standing at the very spot where 
Westboro stood, holding signs that said ‘God Bless America’ and ‘God Loves You,’ would not 
have been subjected to liability. It was what Westboro said that exposed it to tort damages.”).  
 151. See id. (“What Westboro said, in the whole context of how and where it chose to say it, 
is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First Amendment, and that protection cannot be 
overcome by a jury finding that the picketing was outrageous.”).  
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In his concurrence, which made clear that he favored a case-by-
case approach to balancing First Amendment and tort interests, 
Justice Breyer conceptualized the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress in terms of the state’s effort to regulate a certain 
kind of behavior. 
To uphold the application of state law in these circumstances would 
punish Westboro for seeking to communicate its views on matters of 
public concern without proportionately advancing the State’s 
interest in protecting its citizens against severe emotional harm.152 
Notice, however, that Justice Breyer’s defense of the state interest 
remains couched in the regulatory vision of tort law that has 
dominated the Court’s jurisprudence since Sullivan. 
Only Justice Alito expressed concern, writing a dissent in which 
he insisted that the First Amendment does not mean that the 
Westboro Baptist Church “may intentionally inflict severe emotional 
injury on private persons at a time of intense emotional sensitivity by 
launching vicious verbal attacks that make no contribution to public 
debate.”153 The bulk of his opinion focused on the church’s tactic of 
using funerals to garner public attention, the limited public interest of 
the attacks directed specifically at Snyder and his family, and the wide 
availability of other fora in which to share their public message.154 But 
even Justice Alito conceded the majority’s assumption that tort law 
was a form of regulation, with liability designed to deter unwanted 
speech. Hence, he wrote, “[t]o protect against such injury, most if not 
all jurisdictions permit recovery in tort for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.”155 
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The assumption that tort law is a form of government regulation 
is particularly strange in light of the tort at issue in Snyder—
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Although the verdict in 
that case was based on an invasion of privacy claim as well, the 
conflict between intentional infliction of emotional distress and the 
First Amendment was the main issue on appeal.156 The intentional 
 
 152. Id. at 1222 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 153. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 154. Id. at 1223–26. 
 155. Id. at 1222 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 156. Id. at 1213 (majority opinion). 
OMAN & SOLOMON IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2013  12:15 PM 
1136 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1109 
infliction of emotional distress tort provides a clear example of a tort 
that was created by judges to provide redress for victims of wrongs, 
and in doing so, to reinforce social equality.157 Even the most 
committed economists would have a hard time making the descriptive 
claim that intentional infliction of emotional distress was created as a 
means of government putting a price on certain kinds of harmful 
activity so as to discourage it. 
The origins of the tort lie in early twentieth-century cases in 
which individuals suffered harm from passing trains, but without 
direct physical contact.158 These cases, analyzed in depth by Professor 
Barbara Welke and by Professors Martha Chamallas and Jennifer 
Wriggins in recent books, were known as “fright” cases.159 The word 
“fright” refers to the kind of injury that people thought women had 
suffered when trains passed too close to their homes, stopped 
suddenly in front of them, and the like.160 But fright was not even 
considered to be an injury at the time, simply a condition.161 And it 
was a condition invoked particularly by women, who were not 
represented among judges and juries.162 
The early lawsuits against the railroads in these circumstances 
generally failed.163 In not recognizing these injuries, the courts were 
saying (one might argue) that those who suffer these kinds of 
injuries—here, women—do not count. When courts moved later to 
recognize emotional distress as legitimate, they were validating the 
 
 157. See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of 
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 42, 42 (1982) (“The tort provides recovery to victims of socially reprehensible 
conduct, and leaves it to the judicial process to determine, on a case-by-case basis, what conduct 
should be so characterized.”). 
 158. BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW, 
AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865–1920, at 229–31 (2001). 
 159. See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: 
RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 39–46 (2010); WELKE, supra note 158, at 203–34. 
 160. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 159, at 40; Martha Chamallas & Linda K. 
Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 826–43 
(1990) (describing early railroad-related fright cases).  
 161. E.g., WELKE, supra note 158, at 229–31; Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 160, at 819–
21. 
 162. E.g., WELKE, supra note 158, at 229–31; Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 160, at 819–
21.  
 163. See, e.g., CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 159, at 40 (“As with so many other 
legal disputes, the choice of classification was crucial: if the claim was for mental disturbance, 
there would be no recovery . . . .”); WELKE, supra note 158, at 212 (“In New York, 
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and the few states that followed their lead, gender and class 
combined with other factors to shape a rule of no liability for nervous ills . . . .”). 
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very real injuries that women had suffered, and they were affirming 
women’s equal claim to personhood.164 Recognizing this new tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress thus can be seen as the 
state putting its imprimatur on certain conduct as wrong, and on a 
class of plaintiffs as morally entitled to demand redress or justice. 
How does this lens help us understand Snyder? It was 
unacceptable for Phelps to treat Snyder, a father grieving his son’s 
loss, as simply a pawn in his larger plan to alert the country to the 
moral rot that Phelps believed was taking place. Providing redress for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress is a way that the state can 
underscore Snyder’s equal moral worth. Snyder’s claim is a chapter 
that fits easily in the story of a tort that has been significantly 
involved in the evolution of social norms on how to treat different 
kinds of people over the last century. But it is a poor fit for a story 
about the government’s attempt to regulate harmful activity. Which 
brings us to the puzzle: why did all three opinions in Snyder assume 
that the underlying tort law was simply a species of government 
regulation? It is this question that we attempt to unpack in Part III. 
III.  UNPACKING THE SUPREME COURT’S  
THEORY OF PRIVATE LAW 
In this Part, we unpack the Supreme Court’s theory of private 
law through the lens of Snyder. In our view, the conception of private 
law as government regulation comes from a combination of (1) the 
doctrinal tools that judges use in First Amendment cases, (2) the 
unitary nature of the state-action doctrine, and (3) the influence of 
instrumentalism in obscuring the plaintiff’s agency and the state 
interest in redress, while privileging a particular view of 
compensation. We explain what we mean by this in the proceeding 
discussion, and then in Part IV, we offer some preliminary thoughts 
on the normative implications if the Court were more attentive to the 
rights to redress embedded in private law. 
A. First Amendment Doctrine 
Generalizing about First Amendment doctrine is a dangerous 
task. The Supreme Court and First Amendment scholars generally 
 
 164. See WELKE, supra note 158, at 234 (“In the law of nervous shock, courts not only 
acknowledged the extent of the dependence and vulnerability which defined modern life, they 
as well extended the sphere of the law’s protection to the intangible space of the mind. In so 
doing, they contributed to a redefinition of the scope of liberty in modern life.”). 
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agree, however, that most First Amendment cases involve assessing 
the First Amendment values at stake in light of the state interest in 
the underlying law being challenged.165 This analysis, though, does not 
amount to a simple balancing of the scales.166  
The problem in the speech-tort context, though, is that the 
Supreme Court’s theory of private law skews the way that both the 
First Amendment and state tort interests are assessed. Specifically, 
the Supreme Court’s theory reinforces two mistaken assumptions 
about the purpose and effect of state tort law. First, on the state-
interest side, it bolsters the suspicion that an illicit purpose or motive 
is at work.167 If the state is regulating, then it must be suppressing.168 
This is, after all, what “deterrence” is all about: preventing the 
wrongful conduct (here, speech) from happening in the first place. 
Second, the theory of private law as regulation is providing a 
presumption of “effects” on the First Amendment side of the 
equation: that speech will indeed be suppressed.169 
Recall that First Amendment doctrine strives to strike a balance 
between the constitutional interest in speech on the one hand, and the 
state interests in redress or regulation on the other. In doing this, the 
doctrine uses the basic categories of “content-based” and “content-
neutral” regulation to serve as a rough divide between suspicious and 
 
 165. The majority opinion in Snyder itself explicitly acknowledged that this was its task, 
though without using the disfavored “balancing” word: “As we have noted, ‘the sensitivity and 
significance of the interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and [state law] 
rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate 
context of the instant case.’” Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989)). 
 166. See Frank I. Michelman, Discretionary Interests—Takings, Motives, and 
Unconstitutional Conditions: Commentary on Radin and Sullivan, 55 ALB. L. REV. 619, 619–20 
(1992) (asserting that balancing and categorizing are better seen as a reflection of judgments 
about the importance of underlying governmental interests); Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding 
Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 712 
(1994) (arguing that constitutional adjudication is less about balancing, and more about 
“defining the kinds of reasons that are impermissible justifications for state action in different 
spheres”). 
 167. Alexander Bickel distinguished the term “motives” from “purposes” by arguing that 
“motives” referred to the actual intention of legislators who supported the statute, while 
“purposes” referred to what an outside observer would impute to the statute based on the 
available evidence. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 61–63 (1962). 
 168. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594–2600 (2012) (discussing 
the tax/penalty distinction, with taxes designed to put a price on activity and penalties designed 
to suppress it). Thanks to Katie Ertmer for this interesting analogy. 
 169. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword, Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 56, 69–70 (1997) (discussing “effects tests”). 
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less suspicious government action.170 This division has been criticized 
as a crude one,171 but has been explained by scholars such as Professor 
Jed Rubenfeld and now-Justice Elena Kagan as a proxy for or means 
of “flushing out” suspect or illegitimate government motives, namely 
suppressing disfavored speech.172 
This kind of doctrine—deploying tools for flushing out 
“motive”—is common in constitutional adjudication.173 To be sure, 
the Supreme Court has denied, in the seminal case United States v. 
O’Brien,174 that government purpose is relevant, but scholars have 
persuasively shown that the Court’s actions in subsequent cases prove 
otherwise.175 In O’Brien, the Court was concerned about “effects” on 
 
 170. See Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 235 (2012) 
(describing the “two basic ideas behind the content-discrimination principle” as being that it is 
“usually wrong” for government to regulate based on the content of the speech, and “usually 
acceptable” to regulate for other reasons).  
 171. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of 
Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 50 (2000) (arguing 
that the Court’s application of the distinction is “inconsistent”); Don Herzog, The Kerr 
Principle, State Action, and Legal Rights, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2006) (observing that the 
“alleged black-letter rule” that the state may not regulate speech on the basis of its content is 
“blatantly false”); cf. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 145, 159 (arguing that the use of strict scrutiny in Equal Protection cases reflects an 
empirical assumption about the “perceived likelihood of legitimate versus illegitimate 
motives”). 
 172. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 77, at 441 (“By using these rules, courts could invalidate 
laws supported by improper reasons without ever confronting the problems of proof generated 
by a direct inquiry into motive. The function of the rules [is] in flushing out impermissibly 
motivated actions . . . .”); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 
767, 794 (2001) (explaining that the narrow-tailoring test is used as a “smoking-out” device in 
circumstances where the evidence gives rise to a “strong suspicion” of unconstitutional 
purpose).  
 173. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Alexander, Introduction, Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 926 (1978) (outlining the kinds of questions a theory of motivation 
inquiry would have to answer (citing Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the 
Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95; and John Hart Ely, 
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970))); 
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 302 
(1997) (“This Article attempts to identify principles that the Court may use to guide its purpose 
scrutiny in a manner consistent with its constitutional role.”). 
 174. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 175. See Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 
1787–88 (2008) (noting that, despite the Court’s protestation in O’Brien, courts had “long been 
willing to consider some objective indicia of legislative purpose” in assessing the 
constitutionality of a statute, even if they had been unwilling to scrutinize the “legislature’s 
inner workings”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged as much. See Sorrell v. IMS 
Health, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011) (“Just as the ‘inevitable effect of a statute on its face may 
render it unconstitutional,’ a statute’s stated purposes may also be considered.” (quoting 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 384)). 
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speech, another common test in constitutional adjudication.176 But 
many perfectly permissible “content-neutral” regulations have the 
effect of lessening the amount of speech—it is when the government 
seeks to (again, purpose or motive is at work) suppress speech 
because of its content that the Court gets worried.177 
One can argue, of course, that in a case like Snyder, this is 
precisely what the government is doing through its agent, the jury. It 
is regulating Phelps’s speech because it is “outrageous,” a judgment 
about content and a key element in the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress tort that is primarily at issue in Snyder.178 But 
suppressing or putting a high price on speech because of its 
offensiveness to the majority is exactly what the First Amendment is 
designed to protect against.179 So the argument goes. 
What this argument misses, however, is the nature of the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress tort. It is a tort limited to 
situations in which people deliberately use speech as a weapon for 
inflicting severe emotional harm.180 The “outrageousness” element is 
not an indicator that the tort is designed or used to go after unpopular 
views. The outrageousness requirement is to make sure that the 
speech is sufficiently egregious that it is not simply something that the 
majority doesn’t like.181 The strength of the constitutional suspicion 
 
 176. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383, 385; see also supra note 169. 
 177. See Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and 
Improper Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 82 (2003) (characterizing the 
framework of First Amendment law as “being as concerned with illicit government purposes as 
it is with effects”); Fallon, supra note 169, at 90–102 (arguing that purpose-based tests and their 
surrogates play a more central role in constitutional doctrine than has been appreciated, 
including in First Amendment doctrine). 
 178. See David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests: 
Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1531 (1992) 
(pointing out that the “legitimacy of government power depends also on the purpose behind its 
exercise” and that the purpose gets greater scrutiny “the more deeply revered the right”). 
 179. See supra note 12. But see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness, 
and the Open Texture of Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473, 477–78 (2011) (arguing that the 
“outrageousness” standard is a high threshold to meet, and that the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress tort is far more cabined than the Court seems to think). 
 180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). In fact, some commentators have 
proposed new torts because intentional infliction is so limited. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, 
Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 151–57 (1982) (walking through cases and concluding that courts 
generally “have not recognized the gravity of racial insults” in denying many apparently strong 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims).  
 181. See Zipursky, supra note 179, at 500–04 (explaining how the outrageousness 
requirement serves as a judicial screening device to limit liability). Assume, though, that the 
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here, we posit, comes from attributing the interest in speech-
suppression to the state itself. The state of Maryland, not just a 
particular jury deputized by it, wants to protect its citizens from 
emotional harm, the argument goes, by suppressing speech. 
Attributing this goal to the state, however, is problematic in 
many respects. In a case like Snyder, involving a common-law action, 
“the state” is at once everywhere and nowhere. It empowers plaintiffs 
to bring lawsuits.182 It provides its authority to juries to decide what is 
acceptable and what is outrageous. And it, of course, provides a 
forum for the highly staged dance of demands for accountability and 
explanations of conduct to take place.183 At the same time, the state 
has no control over the litigation. Rather, the decision to bring an 
action and the subsequent course of the litigation is left entirely in the 
hands of the victim. 
The state’s alleged motive or purpose in deterring speech plays 
an important role, standing alone, in elevating the First Amendment 
concerns.184 But what the Supreme Court is also doing here is using 
government motive as a way to extrapolate to government effect. 
Attributing a suppressionist motive helps to create the assumption 
that the state law has a suppressionist effect.185 
 
Court is right about this danger of juries. If it was only juries that the Court was worried about, 
then the First Amendment interests still might not have enough bite. After all, juries are 
historically designed to serve as a bulwark against government power, and though this function 
has been greatly diminished in the civil context, the mythology around this role of the jury 
remains. Cf. Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J. 1331, 
1342–45 (2012) (discussing the lack of contemporary justification for the civil jury on this 
ground). The jury is not the agent of government oppression; it is the counterweight to it. See 
generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 81–
110 (1998). Amar refers to the “populist and local institution of the jury” as “[t]he dominant 
strategy to keep agents of the central government under control.” Id. at 83. 
 182. Arguably, this context is an example of what Don Herzog has called the “Kerr 
principle,” a principle in constitutional adjudication that “bars the state from serving as a 
conduit for private parties’ illegitimate preferences.” See Herzog, supra note 171, at 1–2. 
 183. See MILNER S. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW: A THEOLOGICAL, 
HUMANISTIC VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS 42–63 (1981) (describing trials as a type of theater); 
ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 34–72 (1999) (explicating trials as a set of highly 
structured linguistic practices where a person “actually ‘performs’ his or her interpretation of 
events in a public forum” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 184. See Nelson, supra note 175, at 1856–57 (positing that the outcome of judicial review in 
constitutional challenges can frequently “hinge” on the court’s assessment of legislative 
purpose: “Was the legislature trying to produce the adverse effects in question, or were those 
effects simply incidental to the legislature’s pursuit of some legitimate objective?”). 
 185. In the course of disagreeing with Jed Rubenfeld’s argument for focusing on legislative 
purpose in First Amendment adjudication, Judge Posner acknowledges this role for 
governmental purpose. 
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The Supreme Court’s “effects” concern in a case like Snyder, 
involving a multimillion dollar jury verdict, is with the next speaker. If 
someone wanted to voice concerns on public issues in a way that 
could be construed as hurtful, even if meant simply to be provocative, 
would the speaker be chilled from undertaking such speech? The 
answer depends on an empirical question about the degree to which 
tort law—specifically “speech torts” such as defamation, privacy, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress—affects people’s 
behavior.186 We have very little empirical evidence on this question,187 
but the relatively small number of such claims—and lack of 
widespread awareness of claims brought, verdicts achieved, and the 
like—suggests that the effect is likely to be minimal. Given the weak 
support for the claim that cases like Synder’s suppress speech, why 
does the Court remain concerned? 
Because, as we have already posited, the Court fears that the 
state is trying to suppress speech. By enabling an intentional infliction 
of emotional distress tort, the state’s motive—so the conventional 
story goes, repeated in all three opinions in Snyder—was to limit (or 
deter) such speech.188 If the state is setting up and maintaining an 
expensive apparatus—the tort system—for deterring such conduct, 
then the Court must assume that the game is worth the candle. 
 
The purpose, even the motives, behind a regulation of expressive activity may indeed 
be relevant—to assessing its consequences. We often and rationally infer the probable 
consequences of an action from evidence of a desire by the actor to produce them. 
People generally don’t undertake a course of action without reason to believe that it 
will accomplish their purpose in undertaking it. 
Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 737, 745 (2002). 
 186. Richard Fallon points to Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), 
as examples of cases that rely on “empirical, predictive calculations” in making constitutional 
judgments, Fallon, supra note 169, at 63. 
 187. See Faigman, supra note 178, at 1524–25 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
questionable practice of incorporating consideration of government interests into the definition 
of whether a constitutional right is implicated permits the Court to “avoid answering difficult 
empirical questions inherent in government interest analysis”). 
 188. See supra note 12; Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (defining the State’s interest as “protecting its citizens against severe emotional 
harm”); id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that “most if not all” jurisdictions allow the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress tort “[t]o protect against such injury” (quoting Hustler Magazine, 
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
  The trial court instructed the jury along these lines as well. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 
F.3d 206, 214–15, 221 (4th Cir. 2009) (reversing a jury instruction on other grounds that read in 
part: “The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment interest in protecting particular 
types of speech must be balanced against a state’s interest in protecting its residents from 
wrongful injury”), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).  
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Notice, however, that this entire chain of inferences and intuitions 
rests on the assumption that the primary goal of state tort law is 
regulatory. 
B. State Action 
The Court’s focus on tort law as a form of state regulation may 
also be driven by the nature of the state-action doctrine. In this 
Section, we briefly explain why we think this is the case. The state-
action doctrine is the mechanism by which courts determine whether 
a particular action ought to receive constitutional scrutiny, and it has 
been the site of much contentiousness among courts and scholars 
since the beginning of the twentieth century.189 Constitutional rights, 
of course, can only be invoked against action fairly attributable to the 
state, and so the state-action doctrine seeks to answer this question of 
proper attribution.190 
Since Shelley v. Kraemer,191 common-law actions brought by 
private parties can be deemed state action.192 Shelley arose from 
attempts by private parties to use litigation to uphold racial 
segregation. Applying the state-action doctrine to this litigation and 
finding it to be state action allowed federal courts to use the 
Fourteenth Amendment to dismantle de jure racial apartheid in 
American housing.193 Then, in New York Times v. Sullivan, Sullivan 
was an individual suing the New York Times for libel arising out of 
 
 189. For a sampling of the vast literature, see sources cited in Gillian E. Metzger, 
Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1446 nn. 273–74 (2003). For a recent 
critique, see Peller & Tushnet, supra note 41, at 789, which argues that the false public-private 
distinction that grounds the state-action doctrine makes the doctrine “analytically incoherent.” 
 190. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (describing the question as 
one of “fair attribution” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 191. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 192. See id. at 19–20 (holding that court enforcement of a racial covenant on property was 
state action). How far Shelley extends beyond its facts, though, has been much debated. See, e.g., 
Kevin Cole, Federal and State “State Action”: The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized 
Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 327, 352 (1990) (pointing out that the state’s involvement in Shelley 
was so minimal that “it is difficult to imagine any case in which state action is not present”); 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional 
Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302, 316–17 (1995) (noting that 
“Shelley has proven controversial because it could be read to mean that any court involvement 
in an essentially private dispute satisfies the state action requirement,” but that it can also be 
construed more narrowly). 
 193. See generally Charles L. Black, Foreword, “State Action,” Equal Protection, and 
California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967). 
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the civil rights struggle in Alabama.194 And this was the context in 
which the First Amendment was first applied to suits among private 
parties.195 In a sense Sullivan, decided sixteen years later, was a logical 
extension of Shelley. 
Since Sullivan, though, the scope of what is considered state 
action for First Amendment purposes has continued to grow,196 and it 
is worth pausing to consider just how much the factual circumstances 
of Sullivan differ from those in Snyder. Snyder is an individual citizen 
whose son died at war and was only in the spotlight because the 
Westboro Baptist Church decided to show up at his son’s funeral. His 
entanglement with the “state” was simply availing himself of the right 
of any citizen to bring a civil suit. In contrast, Sullivan basically was 
the state; he was an elected city commissioner in Montgomery, 
Alabama.197 The lawsuit was a part of a strategy—later documented 
by Anthony Lewis and others—to threaten Northern newspapers 
that, like the Times, reported on the civil rights movement, in an 
effort to discourage them from criticizing segregationist policies.198 
That is to say, it was an effort by elected officials to use the legal 
system to suppress future speech. 
In contrast to the factual circumstances of Snyder, in which a 
private citizen brought an individual lawsuit, consider another First 
Amendment case, Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,199 also decided in 2011. 
Vermont had passed a law barring the sale (or give-away) of doctors’ 
prescription records by pharmacies and data miners, unless the 
doctors gave permission.200 The prescription records were valuable to 
 
 194. Id. at 256. 
 195. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). The Court explained: 
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have 
applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on 
their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law has 
been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by 
statute. The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever 
the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
 196. See Developments in the Law—State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1255–66 (2010) (providing an analytic summary of the evolution of the 
state-action doctrine). 
 197. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256. Compare this with someone like Jerry Falwell, who is a public 
figure but not a government official. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49 (1988). 
 198. See generally LEWIS, supra note 128. 
 199. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 200. An Act of Mar. 5, 2008, No. 89, 2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves 4 (codified as amended at 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4631 (West (2012).  
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companies that were marketing pharmaceuticals to doctors and their 
patients.201 So here we have the state of Vermont, speaking through its 
legislature, telling companies not to do certain activities within its 
borders, at least without consent. This is clearly state action in a way 
that Snyder’s private lawsuit is not. 
The problem with the state-action doctrine is that it does not 
take into account the differences between the type and extent of state 
involvement in the Snyder and Sorrell cases.202 The state-action 
doctrine is unitary: either something is state action, or it is not.203 If it 
is, then full-blown constitutional scrutiny applies; if it is not, then no 
constitutional scrutiny applies. But the concerns underlying the First 
Amendment are not necessarily as salient in cases in which a private 
party brings a lawsuit, as opposed to those in which a state legislature 
passes a statute, as in Sorrell, or a public official either uses his 
authority or the courts, as in Sullivan. This is because in providing 
recourse through the private law, the state is not primarily regulating 
or punishing speech, as opposed to the effort by Vermont to suppress 
a certain class of commercial expression. 
The effect of this unitary aspect of the state-action doctrine is to 
exacerbate the tendency to view the common law as an arm of state 
regulation. After all, regulation is what the state does in the twenty-
first century.204 So if it is indeed the state acting, then that is what it 
must be doing: regulating conduct. Surely the twenty-first-century 
state does not provide fora for slightly more civilized duels.205 
Moreover, the acceptance of the “everything is state action” status 
quo has led the doctrine to bleed over far beyond the specific 
question that it is designed to answer: whether the government is 
 
 201. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659–60. 
 202. This is of course just one problem with the much-criticized doctrine. For another kind 
of critique, see Michael L. Wells, Identifying State Actors in Constitutional Litigation: Reviving 
the Role of Substantive Context, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 99, 120–25 (2004), which argues that the 
doctrine relies too much on state involvement, and should take account of “substantive context” 
as well as the values implicated by the particular constitutional rights, id. at 120–25.  
 203. E.g., John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 83 N.C. L. 
REV. 569, 578 (2005) (“[T]he state action issue presents an all-or-nothing question. Either there 
is state action, in which case the ultimate act is attributed to the government, or there is no state 
action, and the case is dismissed. No middle ground is available.”).  
 204. See EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR 
THE MODERN STATE 204 (2005) (suggesting that “policy and implementation”—the basic tools 
of regulation—“constitute the full range of governmental action in a modern state”). 
 205. But see Oman, supra note 4, at 45–49 (exploring the historical relationship between 
litigation and dueling). 
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sufficiently involved in the challenged action such that constitutional 
protections apply at all.206 One can agree that common-law actions 
and enforcement implicate “the state” such that they may be subject 
to challenge under the Constitution on the one hand, without 
committing to the view that the animating purpose or function of the 
common law is state regulation.207 
A defender of the Court can respond that it is true that the 
common law can be characterized, perhaps is even best characterized, 
as serving an interest in redress. Perhaps that is the underlying 
purpose of private law, at least tort law. But that does not mean that 
tort law cannot also have the effect of putting a price on certain 
activity so as (whether intentionally or otherwise) to discourage it.208 
State-provided fora where lawsuits can result in the payment of 
money damages can do that. 
If private law has the effect of discouraging speech by putting a 
price on it (and in Snyder, it turned out to be a pretty high one, $5 
million),209 then courts must obey the stricture of the Bill of Rights, 
according to this view. The federal interest simply trumps. In our 
view, consistent with Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Snyder, this is 
both inconsistent with the thrust of First Amendment doctrine and 
accords the federal constitutional interest too much weight. Rather, 
as we suggest in Part IV, freedom of speech should be protected in 
ways that do not eliminate any recourse by victims against those that 
wrong them. The private-law baby ought not to be thrown out with 
the regulatory bath water. 
C. Instrumentalism’s Influence 
Besides the unitary state-action requirement, the instrumentalist 
view of private law also gives the state a greater role than it actually 
has in a case like Snyder. According to the instrumentalist view, 
 
 206. See supra note 190.  
 207. E.g., Herzog, supra note 171, at 22–23. In this sense, the state-action doctrine is less 
about “attribution” or causation, and more about responsibility—the state cannot be responsible 
for the suppression of speech, even if it is not doing the suppressing itself, or making the tort 
available for the purpose of suppression.  
 208. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) (“The fear of damage awards 
under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly more inhibiting 
than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute.”).  
 209. The original jury verdict was actually $10.9 million, made up of $2.9 million in 
compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages, but the amount was reduced by the 
trial court to a total of $5 million by decreasing the punitive award. See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. 
Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).  
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particularly the law-and-economics variant, the plaintiff is a private 
attorney general, acting on behalf of the government to deter 
undesirable behavior.210 But this imposes a particular theoretical 
construct on facts that are unlikely to fit it. The public record contains 
little on Snyder’s motives for bringing the lawsuit, but it seems most 
plausible that he was acting on behalf of himself and his deceased son, 
not the state of Maryland.211 Certainly, the law of Maryland did not 
treat Snyder’s cause of action as a mere extension of its regulatory 
aims. Rather, his standing to sue depended decisively on his status as 
a victim of the Westboro Baptist Church’s actions, and under 
Maryland law the right of action against Phelps was a piece of 
personal property that belonged exclusively to Synder.212 
Doctrinally, in the cases on the conflict between the First 
Amendment and speech torts, it matters whether plaintiffs like 
Snyder are “public figures” or not.213 Snyder and his son were private 
figures, unlike Jerry Falwell, the plaintiff in the Supreme Court’s only 
other case involving intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
 
 210. For example, some scholars have argued that speech torts are an area of civil liability 
for which First Amendment protection ought to be at its highest because the government’s use 
of its power is “duty-defining.” E.g., Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free 
Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1686 (2009). According to this view, 
private law is used here as “a way for the government to regulate social conduct by defining the 
duties and having private parties serve as civil ‘prosecutors’ to enforce them.” Id. This is 
precisely the view that we think has led the doctrine astray. 
 211. See Zipursky, supra note 179, at 505 (“[T]he plaintiff Snyder was not acting as a private 
attorney general of Maryland demanding that some criminal or regulatory fine be handed out; 
Snyder was suing for a wrong to himself.”). 
 212. See, e.g., Jones v. Prince George’s Cnty., 835 A.2d 632, 644 (Md. 2003) (“Under 
Maryland common law, standing to bring a judicial action generally depends on whether one is 
‘aggrieved,’ which means whether a plaintiff has ‘an interest such that he [or she] is personally 
and specifically affected in a way different from . . . the public generally.’” (alterations in 
original) (quoting Sugarloaf Citizens’ Ass’n v. Dep’t of Env’t, 686 A.2d 605, 614 (Md. 1996)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Summers v. Freishtat, 335 A.2d 89, 92 (Md. 1975) (“[T]he 
modern rule, as we have heretofore pointed out, is that a chose in action in tort is generally 
assignable, in the absence of a statutory prohibition, if it is a right which would survive the 
assignor and could be enforced by his personal representative.”); Long Green Valley Ass’n v. 
Bellevale Farms, Inc., 46 A.3d 473, 483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (“Standing rests on ‘a legal 
interest such as . . . one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which 
confers a privilege.’” (quoting Comm. for Responsible Dev. on 25th St. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 
767 A.2d 906, 912 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
Roberts v. Total Heath Care, Inc., 709 A.2d 142, 153 (Md. 1998) (citing Summers v. Freishtat, 
335 A.2d 89 (Md. 1975), as setting the standard for assignability of choses in action). 
 213. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974); see also Mark Strasser, 
Funeral Protests, Privacy, and the Constitution: What Is Next After Phelps?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 
279, 293–96 (2011) (arguing that Snyder’s ignoring of this issue does not reflect the current state 
of First Amendment law). 
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the First Amendment, Hustler.214 But Justice Roberts’s opinion 
ignores entirely this issue, despite the fact that it was the ground on 
which the district court ruled that the verdict should stand. 
Under an instrumentalist view of private law, how public a figure 
the plaintiff is ought not to matter at all. In bringing the lawsuit, the 
plaintiff becomes an agent of the state. But the reason Snyder’s 
private-ness or public-ness does matter in First Amendment doctrine, 
contra instrumentalism, is that it affects his entitlement to recourse. 
That is to say, even if Richard Jewell, the Atlanta security guard 
suspected of bombing the Olympics in 1996, had been defamed, as he 
claimed in his lawsuit, he was not entitled to complain because he had 
“thrust himself to the forefront” of public life.215 This is consistent 
with a kind of “consensual waiver” approach to First Amendment 
doctrine.216 It also accords with well-established tort doctrines like the 
assumption of risk.217 
Below we outline three other ways that an instrumental view 
obscures important features of private law in a case like Snyder’s. 
Specifically, the instrumental approach ignores the plaintiff’s agency, 
the state interest in redress, and the degree to which compensation is 
a form of justice. 
1. Ignoring Plaintiffs’ Agency.  One of the results of the Court’s 
emphasis on state tort law as a form of public regulation is to render 
the agency of the plaintiff in bringing the lawsuit largely invisible. 
One of the core features of the law of private wrongs is that nothing 
happens unless a wronged plaintiff chooses to sue.218 The machinery 
 
 214. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (“Respondent would have 
us find that a State’s interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is sufficient to 
deny First Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is intended to inflict 
emotional injury, even when that speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating 
actual facts about the public figure involved. This we decline to do.”). 
 215. Atl. Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 182–85 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). 
 216. See Solomon, Judging Plaintiffs, supra note 4, at 1767–68 (explaining the public-figure 
doctrine as a variant of assumption of risk).  
 217. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965) (“A plaintiff who voluntarily 
assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot 
recover for such harm.”); id. § 496A cmt. c(2) (“[Assumption of risk means] that the plaintiff 
has entered voluntarily into some relation with the defendant which he knows to involve the 
risk, and so is regarded as tacitly or impliedly agreeing to relieve the defendant of responsibility, 
and to take his own chances. . . . [T]he legal result is that the defendant is relieved of his duty to 
the plaintiff.”).  
 218. See Oman, supra note 4, at 39 (“[T]he private law empowers plaintiffs to act against 
defendants. Plaintiffs may choose to bring suit against tortfeasors and contract breachers, but 
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of the law will remain inert unless a private party brings an action.219 
Furthermore, the private party bringing the lawsuit must be a victim 
of the defendant’s action. He must have suffered a wrong of some 
sort. He is thus in a different position than a public prosecutor or 
someone such as a qui tam relator under federal whistleblower 
statutes who need not be a victim of the defendant’s wrongdoing to 
sue.220 Rather, the law of torts empowers victims to act against those 
who have wronged them. 
When tort law is seen purely as a matter of safety regulation or 
loss spreading, the way in which tort law empowers plaintiffs becomes 
at best an idiosyncratic system of private enforcement.221 On this view, 
the regulatory ideal would be for an omniscient and omnicompetent 
state to monitor the behavior of all citizens and to impose sanctions 
on those who frustrate the supposed regulatory goals of tort law.222 
Given the limitations in terms of resources and information that the 
state faces, however, this ideal is not possible. The second-best 
solution is to create private rights of action and then give plaintiffs an 
incentive to sue. Private suits thus serve to vindicate public policy.223 
In short, private litigation is just a pragmatic, second-best solution in 
the face of limitations on the state’s reach. Whatever the merits of this 
argument, however, it completely fails to make sense of certain 
ubiquitous, core features of the law of torts. 
But if tort actions are a second-best means of controlling 
behavior, it makes little sense to confine the right of action to victims. 
 
the law does not require that they do so. Rather, it waits entirely on the plaintiff’s decision to 
sue. Until she brings an action, nothing happens.”).  
 219. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 65, at 738–39. 
 220. See Oman, supra note 4, at 39 (explaining that under “disaggregated enforcement 
mechanisms,” such as qui tam actions, “the plaintiff need not be a victim of the defendant’s 
wrongdoing but may sue as a way of enforcing public policy merely on the basis of 
information”).  
 221. See Jane Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg and Zipursky’s Civil Recourse Theory, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1529, 1538 (2006) (“[C]ivil recourse theory does not fall into the trap of 
depending on the assertion of some ‘goal’ of tort law such as ‘compensation’ or ‘deterrence’ or 
‘loss-spreading.’”).  
 222. See John C.P. Goldberg, Tort in Three Dimensions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 321, 325–26 (2011) 
(ascribing such a view to mid-twentieth century scholars such as Leon Green and William 
Prosser—that tort would be “a branch of the emergent administrative state in which regulations 
directed toward certain kinds of influential actors . . . would be crafted primarily by jurors and 
judges on a case-by-case basis”).  
 223. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 136 (arguing that a norm that encourages 
victims to seek redress is valuable because “deterrence is undermined when victims fail to 
respond”).  
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Remember, according to the second-best argument, private litigation 
is a response to finite government resources and limited government 
information.224 This, however, would imply that anyone with resources 
and information should be allowed to bring a suit to vindicate the 
government’s regulatory interests.225 Tort law, by confining the right 
of action to victims, would seem to undermine the very regulatory 
goals that it is supposedly pursuing. A more plausible view is that 
empowering victims is not a second- or even third-best solution to 
problems of enforcement. Rather, empowering victims by giving them 
the agency to act against their wrongdoers is itself a primary value of 
private law.226 On this view, tort law may be a poor system of risk 
regulation, but that is not its purpose.227 Rather, there is an 
independent normative value in giving victims recourse against 
tortfeasors.228 
One way of thinking about this value is suggested by the writing 
of John Rawls. In A Theory of Justice,229 Rawls argues that there are 
certain preconditions for a good life that hold true regardless of one’s 
 
 224. See id. (“[V]ictims are often in the best position to know when and how much they have 
been injured as well as the identity of injurers.”). 
 225. Indeed, some scholars have proposed exactly this in the context of tort law. See, e.g., 
Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 239, 279–86 (2009) (explicating the appeal of this “private attorneys general” 
model in cases where retributive justice against wrongdoers is warranted, but victims decline to 
sue). 
 226. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 68, at 972 (arguing that it is “legitimate and 
useful” for the state to “afford the victims of certain wrongs an avenue of recourse against those 
who have wronged them,” and referring to civil recourse as “what the state delivers” by having 
tort law). 
 227. Certain features of tort law are plausibly seen as designed to regulate risk, with punitive 
damages being one example. See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677–
78 (7th Cir. 2003). But even punitive damages might fit more comfortably into a wrongs-and-
redress model of tort law. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 68, at 962 (“[T]here is nothing 
remotely surprising about the idea that a victim of a particularly malicious or willful wrong 
would be entitled to ask the court for permission to be punitive in her response to the 
defendant.”); Markel, supra note 225, at 249–50 (“[P]unitive damages should be understood as 
‘quasi-criminal’ ‘private fines’ designed to punish and deter the misconduct at issue.” (quoting 
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001))); Anthony J. 
Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 1025 (2007) (“The 
reason that informs the subjective aspect of punitive damages is the plaintiff’s rational exercise 
of her power to seek redress appropriate to the wrong she suffered.”).  
 228. See Oman, supra note 4, at 40 (“Recourse theorists insist there is some distinctive 
normative goal that is vindicated by giving citizens the ability to proceed in court against those 
that have wronged them.”).  
 229. RAWLS, supra note 51.  
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ultimate beliefs about the shape of that life.230 Because such 
preconditions do not hinge on controversial beliefs about the good or 
moral life but are necessary for virtually every conception of such a 
life, they become a legitimate object for a liberal state.231 Among these 
preconditions, Rawls names self-respect, the notion that the life one is 
pursuing is valuable and worth pursuing.232 Thus far the claim strikes 
us as plausible. Rawls, however, tends to view self-respect as a good 
distributed by a beneficent social planner. It becomes a right that the 
individual claims, like the right to vote or perhaps the right to a 
welfare benefit.233 What this formulation misses is the role of agency 
in generating self-respect.234 
The idea of honor provides a way of thinking about the role of 
agency. Think of a tort as an act of humiliation, a way in which the 
tortfeasor fails to show due concern to the victim. How does one 
recover one’s honor? If the person who humiliates you is punished, 
one might believe that justice has been done, that the injured person 
has received his due reward. Yet just punishment is not the same 
thing as the restoration of lost honor—of lost self-respect.235 
Here it would seem that epic poetry provides a more insightful 
account of self-respect than John Rawls. In The Iliad,236 The Aeneid,237 
or Beowulf,238 a beneficent king does not dispense honor. To be sure, 
all of these stories are set within hierarchical societies in which 
differing levels of honor are attached to certain kinds of statuses—
king, knight, hero, slave, and so on. This status-based honor, however, 
is not the honor that drives the plot.239 Rather the self-respect gained 
by Achilles, Aeneas, and Beowulf comes from their actions. In the 
 
 230. Id. at 155. One of us first used Rawls in this context in Oman, supra note 4, at 55–56 
(citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, at 155–56 (rev. ed. 1999)). 
 231. See RAWLS, supra note 51, at 178–82 (discussing the role of self-respect in the 
deliberations of agents in the original position). 
 232. See id. at 178 (“Self-respect is not so much a part of any rational plan of life as the sense 
that one’s plan is worth carrying out.”). 
 233. See SHARON R. KRAUSE, LIBERALISM WITH HONOR 18 (2002) (“Thus self-esteem is a 
good to be distributed, according to Rawls, and in a just society it will be distributed equally.”).  
 234. Oman, supra note 4, at 56. 
 235. Id. at 62–63.  
 236. HOMER, THE ILIAD (Robert Fagles trans., Viking Penguin 1990) (n.d.). 
 237. VERGIL, THE AENEID (Sarah Ruden trans., Yale Univ. Press 2008) (19 B.C.E.).  
 238. BEOWULF AND OTHER ENGLISH POEMS (Craig Williamson ed. & trans., Univ. of Pa. 
Press 2011).  
 239. See Oman, supra note 4, at 56 (“In The Iliad, honor is not ultimately dispensed by the 
gods, but is gained by heroic actions.”).  
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face of humiliation, taking action against those who have humiliated 
them restores their self-respect.240 
For the heroes of the epic poems, agency against wrongdoers 
took the form of violent self-help. Fortunately, the modern state has 
been relatively successful at suppressing private violence and other 
forms of serious private aggression. We can call those who wrong us 
names, but we cannot act directly against their persons or their 
property. This leaves the modern victim with relatively few options 
for acting against his wrongdoer. Even an act of forgiveness or 
magnanimity loses much of its meaning in a world in which the 
forbearance of the victim has little impact on the wrongdoer. In short, 
there is a sense in which the success of Leviathan in suppressing the 
Hobbesian war of “all against all” is too successful, leaving 
wrongdoers more or less invulnerable to attack by their victim.241 
Private law responds to this problem by creating “liability.” 
Though the word is ubiquitous, its original meaning is seldom fully 
remembered. To be liable is to be vulnerable.242 To be liable to attack 
means that one is vulnerable to attack. It does not mean that the 
attack will actually occur. That is left to the choice of the attacker. 
Tort law defines wrongs, but it does not suppress those wrongs.243 
Rather, it makes the wrongdoer vulnerable to recourse by the 
victim.244 
This recourse, however, is sharply limited. It is civil recourse. 
Nevertheless it avoids the problem of the humiliated and powerless 
victim that is created by the complete suppression of self-help.245 In 
effect we solve the problem of Leviathan’s overeffectiveness by 
reintroducing the war of all against all into society, albeit in a very 
 
 240. See, e.g., HOMER, supra note 236, at 421 (“Fight like men, my friends . . . ! [Patroclus 
urges.] Now we must win high honor for Peleus’ royal son . . . !”).  
 241. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN passim (Everyman’s Library 1983) (1651).  
 242. See Jason M. Solomon, Civil Recourse as Social Equality, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 243, 
249–50 (2011) (relating this meaning of “vulnerable” to the vulnerability that accompanies 
physical embodiment and is often taken advantage of in a situation resulting in tortiously caused 
harm). 
 243. See Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 65, at 90 (“The tort law defines 
the ways in which we wrong one another . . . .”).  
 244. Id.  
 245. See id. at 85 (referring to the law of civil recourse as allowing society to “avoid[] the 
mayhem and crudeness of vengeful private retribution, but without the unfairness of leaving 
individuals powerless against invasions of their rights”).  
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stylized form that sharply limits the scope of conflict.246 Nevertheless, 
litigation is a form of conflict, a way in which a victim chooses—or 
not—to act against her victimizer.247 The danger of a decision such as 
Snyder is that it renders the victim of aggression utterly powerless. 
The victim is deprived by the power of Leviathan from exercising 
self-help to hold the aggressor accountable. At the same time, by in 
effect eliminating the victim’s cause of action against a tortfeasor, 
Snyder also eliminates the possibility of acting in the courts. Above 
and beyond any evil caused by inefficient levels of deterrence or 
losses left uncompensated, the Court in Synder made it impossible for 
the victim to reassert his worth and honor through action in the face 
of aggression. 
Another way of thinking about the value of agency is in terms of 
moral address. This refers to the nature of the implicit authority of a 
speaker making normative arguments or claims. The regulatory vision 
of the law sees its obligations primarily in the third person.248 The 
impersonal demands of the law are ideally enforced by the 
impersonal force of the state. The law does not involve the victim 
addressing the tortfeasor and demanding redress.249 At best, on the 
regulatory view, the state addresses itself to the tortfeasor through 
the person of the victim, who is reduced to an instrument of the 
state’s policy. 
What the regulatory vision of the law denies is the idea that the 
victim himself has a right to address the tortfeasor and make demands 
 
 246. Cf. HOBBES, supra note 241, at 64 (“[D]uring the time men live without a common 
Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a 
warre, as is of every man against every man.”).  
 247. See Oman, supra note 4, at 63–64 (“Suing someone is more than simply a petition for 
redress. It is an act of aggression by the plaintiff against the wrongdoer. Likewise the process of 
litigation is a battle and a struggle.”).  
 248. In moral philosophy, such obligations are also referred to as “state-of-the-world-
regarding.” STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 5 (2006). That is, the obligation exists because the world would be a 
better place if it were so, not because of any reason one might have for having such an 
obligation (first-person), or because of anything owed to another (second-person). See id. at 5–6 
(citing G.E.MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA (1993)).  
 249. An alternative view of the law, consistent with what we describe here and also based in 
significant part on Stephen Darwall’s work, is presented in Robin Bradley Kar, The Second 
Person Standpoint and the Law 14–19 (Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 10-19, 2010), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1589791 (using Darwall’s work to argue 
that “legal obligations purport to have a special form of authority, which is best understood as 
involving either implicit or explicit interpersonal demands”).  
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on him as a result of his wrongdoing.250 It is the difference between 
saying, “One should not step on the feet of others” and saying, “Hey 
you! Get off my foot.”251 The second form of address acknowledges 
the moral authority that a victim acquires over a wrongdoer, an 
authority that gives the victim the right to make demands on the 
person who has victimized him. 
Bringing a lawsuit, then, is a way for an individual to demand 
answers or accountability from one who has wronged him. In 
providing a forum for such practices, the state reinforces a particular 
kind of social equality that is relational.252 It underscores that no 
individual’s interests are above another’s simply because of status or 
wealth.253 It underscores that we all have obligations to one another, 
and are answerable for these obligations.254 And by empowering 
victims to demand accountability, the state underscores each 
individual’s moral authority and personal agency. 
2. The Missing State Interest in Redress.  Acknowledging the 
importance of empowering victims and providing a legal mechanism 
for them to exercise agency against their victimizers have implications 
for how one conceptualizes the state interest in private-law cases. 
When private law is seen as a regulatory enterprise, the state interest 
centers on controlling the behavior of the defendant.255 For example, 
the purpose of libel law becomes the suppression of libelous speech. 
The purpose of products-liability law becomes the elimination of 
defective products. And so on. 
Placing the agency of the plaintiff in the foreground of the 
discussion of tort law, however, recasts the state interest. Although 
the state may be interested in suppressing certain kinds of wrongs 
 
 250. See Solomon, Equal Accountability, supra note 4, at 1810 (“From the state’s 
perspective, by establishing a system whereby individuals can hold those who have wronged 
them legally accountable, the state underscores the moral accountability we have toward one 
another as well. The state does this simply by establishing the system and making it available.”). 
 251. This example is drawn from DARWALL, supra note 248, at 5–6. 
 252. See Solomon, supra note 242, at 256 (“By empowering individuals with the right to 
recourse, the state affirms relational equality in giving individuals the authority to make 
demands of others and also the obligation to respond to those demands.”). 
 253. See Goldberg, supra note 65, at 607–08 (articulating tort law’s role in promoting and 
maintaining a “nonhierarchical conception of social ordering”).  
 254. See Solomon, Equal Accountability, supra note 4, at 1807–11 (describing this as a 
“moral community of equals who are mutually accountable”). 
 255. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 86 & n.2 (pointing first to the “incentives it 
creates for potential injurers” as a way to evaluate tort law, and acknowledging in a footnote 
that the influence on potential victims’ behavior is another “important effect”). 
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that give rise to torts, this is not the primary purpose of tort law 
itself.256 Rather, tort law, with its plaintiff- and victim-centered 
structure, advances the state’s interest in providing citizens with 
recourse against those that have harmed them.257 What is important is 
not ensuring that wrongs do not happen but ensuring that if wrongs 
do happen the victim is not left powerless to act against the 
wrongdoer.258 There is ample evidence that providing civil recourse is 
an interest that is deeply embedded in state law. 
Snyder sued Phelps under the Maryland tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Part of the state’s interest in having 
such a tort could be the deterrent effect that the prospect of liability 
might have on those such as Phelps, who set out to terrorize grieving 
families. 
One can imagine, for example, the Maryland state legislature 
holding hearings on the amount of emotional distress that individuals 
are suffering within its borders. One can imagine a blue-ribbon report 
documenting this phenomenon, labeling it a problem, and making 
recommendations about what to do. One of those recommendations 
might be the passage of a law providing for a private right of action 
for individuals to bring tort claims for emotional distress inflicted on 
them, and one can even imagine a purpose or preamble section of the 
statute that specifically says that this is the state’s motive in passing 
the law and including the private right of action: to reduce or deter or 
suppress this kind of conduct, including speech. Indeed, statutes 
providing individuals with private rights of action for wrongs done to 
them are quite common in state and federal law.259 If this were the 
backdrop to Snyder’s lawsuit, then the Supreme Court’s view of the 
lawsuit as a regulatory mechanism would make perfect sense. 
But Maryland’s law at issue here—the common-law tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress—arose quite differently. It 
arose in a context in which individuals came into court seeking 
 
 256. See Zipursky, supra note 179, at 478 (“Tort law, unlike criminal law or regulation, is not 
a series of general prohibitions or restrictions promulgated and then enforced by the state.”). 
 257. Id. at 519. 
 258. Almost in passing, at the end of his Snyder dissent, Justice Alito acknowledges this 
value of a tort claim: “Respondents’ outrageous conduct caused petitioner great injury, and the 
Court now compounds that injury by depriving petitioner of a judgment that acknowledges the 
wrong he suffered.” Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1229 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
 259. In state law, a wave of recent consumer fraud statutes provides perhaps the best 
examples. See Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1501, 1521–25 (2009) (reviewing these developments). 
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redress for wrongs done to them.260 Indeed, Maryland has a deeply 
rooted interest in providing its citizens with the power to act against 
those who wrongfully harm them. The Maryland constitution’s 
Declaration of Rights states 
[t]hat every man, for any injury done to him in his person or 
property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the 
Land, and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale, fully 
without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law 
of the Land.261 
Elsewhere the Declaration states “[t]hat the Inhabitants of Maryland 
are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, 
according to the course of that Law.”262 
What is striking about these constitutional provisions is that 
rather than entitling the citizens of Maryland to some absolute 
protection of their persons and property, they confer upon citizens 
rights of redress, a “remedy by the course of the Law.”263 Far from 
being an anomaly, the Maryland constitution’s emphasis on the right 
to a law of redress for private wrongs represents a powerful strand 
running through American law. Most states have “open courts” 
provisions in their state constitutions guaranteeing to citizens access 
to the courts for the redress of private wrongs.264 Though the way in 
which these provisions are phrased varies from state to state,265 they 
all represent private recourse as a state interest of sufficient 
importance to be enshrined in the state’s fundamental law. 
The notion that members of the community have a basic right of 
access to civil justice against those who have wronged them is also 
deeply embedded in the common-law tradition from which our legal 
system emerged.266 Beginning in the seventeenth century, classical 
common-law theorists such as Coke, Hale, and Selden began 
 
 260. Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 611–17 (Md. 1977). See supra text accompanying notes 
156–166. 
 261. MD. CONST. art. 19. 
 262. Id. art. 5(a). This provision of the state constitution acts as Maryland’s reception statute 
for the common law. 
 263. Id. art. 19. 
 264. See Goldberg, supra note 65, at 560–62 & n.177 (describing the insertion of such rights 
into early state constitutions). 
 265. See David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1201 n.25 (1992) 
(listing state constitutional provisions providing for free and open courts).  
 266. See Goldberg, supra note 65, at 549 (locating these ideas in Blackstone’s Commentaries, 
itself a synthesis of common-law and social-contract theories). 
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articulating a theory of “the ancient constitution” that placed 
significant limitations on royal prerogatives.267 Although the ancient 
constitution was little more than a historical myth, it did mark an 
important set of arguments about the legal institutions to which 
subjects were entitled.268 A key element in this theory was the right to 
redress of private grievances.269 Hence, for example, though the king 
had considerable power to grant special exemptions from the law, the 
classical common-law theorists insisted that he could not do so in a 
way that deprived a wronged subject of recourse against those who 
had committed private wrongs against them.270 These ideas were then 
transmitted via Blackstone and social-contract theorists to America, 
where they formed the basis for the tradition of open-courts 
provisions in state constitutions guaranteeing access to civil justice.271 
Based on these sources, Professor John Goldberg has gone so far 
as to argue that there is a right to a law for the redress of wrongs that 
emerges from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the structure of the federal Constitution.272 According to 
Goldberg, such a right is justified by the historical link between due 
process and redress for wrongs and is consistent with the structure of 
many of the Court’s decisions construing the Due Process Clause.273 
Without taking a position on the ultimate merits of Goldberg’s 
constitutional claim, however, we note that it is not necessary to go so 
far to appreciate the importance of redress. 
Even if the Constitution does not require a law for the redress of 
wrongs, providing such a law surely counts as an important state 
interest, one that is likely to be “so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” that goes 
 
 267. See id. at 532–37 (describing the components of the “ancient constitution”). 
 268. For discussions of the “ancient constitution,” see generally GLENN BURGESS, THE 
POLITICS OF THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH POLITICAL 
THOUGHT, 1603–1642 (1992); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE 
FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
(1987); and JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN LIBERTY (2005). 
 269. Goldberg, supra note 65, at 537–39. 
 270. See id. (discussing limits on the “dispensing power” of the king). 
 271. See supra note 265. Most of these provisions assert that the courts must be open 
“freely” and “without purchase.” See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. 1, § 12. Others state that courts must 
be available to redress harms to “property or character.” See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
 272. See Goldberg, supra note 65, at 583–96 (referring to this as a “structural due process” 
right).  
 273. See id. at 564–80 (analyzing Supreme Court doctrines that consider due process limits 
on remedies).  
OMAN & SOLOMON IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2013  12:15 PM 
1158 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1109 
to the “very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,” and which is 
contained within the written constitutions of many states.274 It is this 
interest in a law that empowers victims to seek redress against those 
who have wronged them—rather than suppressing some particular 
form of behavior—that is largely missing from the way in which the 
Supreme Court conceptualizes the states’ interest in tort law.275 
3. Compensation as Social Insurance or Pricing Mechanism.  The 
instrumentalist view of private law sees compensation or damages as 
a mechanism either of social insurance for accidental harm, or as a 
pricing mechanism for risky activity.276 This view is reflected in the 
contemporary Court’s discussion of compensation like the $5 million 
jury verdict at issue in Snyder. But there is an alternative view with 
deeper historical and cultural roots: namely, that compensation is a 
means of making amends or paying back debt. 
As Professor William Miller has emphasized, money has always, 
across cultures and eras, been a substitute for literally taking the 
other person’s eye when he takes yours.277 If you bring a civil lawsuit 
against one you think has wronged you, you are not seeking 
vengeance, that is, seeking to inflict pain on another like that which 
had been inflicted on you. Instead, you are making a demand to settle 
a moral accounting that stems from the wrong done to you.278 Money 
happens to be the vehicle for settling such accounts. 
 
 274. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 
U.S. 97, 105 (1934)) (internal quotation mark omitted), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 
U.S. 784 (1969). 
 275. See Ronen Perry, Empowerment and Tort Law, 76 TENN. L. REV. 959, 979–80 (2009) 
(“Civil litigation may serve to empower victims in several ways.”); Zipursky, Civil Recourse, 
supra note 65, at 735 (“By recognizing a legal right of action against a tortfeasor, our system 
respects the principle that the plaintiff is entitled to act against one who has legally wronged him 
or her.”).  
 276. Gerald F. Gaus, Does Compensation Restore Equality?, in COMPENSATORY JUSTICE: 
NOMOS XXXIII, at 45, 60–62 (John W. Chapman ed., 1991). 
 277. See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE 25 (2006) (“The fact is that revenge in 
blood invariably coexisted with means of paying off the avenger by transfers of property or 
money-like substances in lieu of blood. . . . Revenge was compensation using blood, not instead 
of money, but as a kind of money.”). 
 278. See Jules L. Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 
426 (1982) (“First, one might argue from the principle of retributive justice for the imposition of 
liability of faulty injurers. Such an argument would hold that wrongdoing, whether or not it 
secures personal gain, is sinful and ought to be punished or sanctioned. Imposing liability in 
torts is a way of sanctioning mischief. Therefore liability is imposed on the faulty injurer not to 
rectify his gain—of which there may be none—but to penalize his moral wrong.”). 
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Though the compensation involved in tort cases can be seen as 
the equivalent of a payment from a “no-fault” government-provided 
fund for accidental injury, such as that from the 9/11 fund for victims’ 
families or the system governing accidental injury in New Zealand,279 
it is of a different character. There is normative significance in the fact 
that the demand for compensation is made to the wrongdoer, not the 
government, and that the demand for justice is made by the victim 
rather than the state, as it is in criminal law.280 These characteristics of 
tort law highlight the normative connection between the “doer and 
the sufferer,”281 as Aristotle described it, and put this particular kind 
of cash payment on a different plane than a Social Security check, for 
example. 
Moreover, though the social insurance mechanism is certainly 
one function that tort compensation serves,282 it is not clear how much 
tort compensation serves this function. Though economic damages 
for wage loss and medical bills are certainly a significant part of tort 
compensation, they are not all. Noneconomic—or pain and 
suffering—damages also make up a major segment of tort damages, 
although caps on such damages may be changing that.283 In Snyder’s 
lawsuit, for example, the amount of “economic” damages—primarily 
 
 279. See generally Craig Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand 
Experience, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 976, 982–83 (1985) (describing New Zealand’s no-fault Accident 
Compensation Act 2001).  
 280. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 65, at 699 (“The state provides the plaintiff 
with a right of action against the defendant for damages or other relief only if the defendant has 
wronged the plaintiff in a manner specified by tort law. In permitting and empowering plaintiffs 
to act against those who have wronged them, the state is not relying upon the idea that a 
defendant has a pre-existing duty of repair. Instead, it is relying on the principle that plaintiffs 
who have been wronged are entitled to some avenue of civil recourse against the tortfeasor who 
wronged them.”). 
 281. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 125 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett 
Publ’g Co. 1985) (c. 384 B.C.E.).  
 282. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and 
Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 
75, 88 (1993) (“In short, the conventional picture of the tort system as a corrective justice and 
deterrence regime is overly simple. Tort liability is also a forced-insurance arrangement, under 
which potential victims are required to insure themselves against the risk of suffering injury 
from the provision of health care or the sale of a product. In this respect, at least, tort law 
constitutes a disguised insurance program that resembles some of the programs that more 
explicitly perform this function.”).  
 283. See, e.g., CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 159, at 170–82 (criticizing such caps as 
having a disproportionate impact on women, children, the elderly, and minorities); 3 DAN B. 
DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 479, at 8 (2d ed. 2011) 
(stating that plaintiffs may recover for “virtually any form of conscious suffering, both 
emotional and physical.”). 
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for psychological counseling—was a miniscule percentage of the 
overall verdict.284 
There is a form of justice involved in tort law. We can call it 
individual justice, corrective justice, or, perhaps, equal accountability. 
We can even see it as a way of redeeming honor or underscoring 
dignity—when the wrongdoer has to pay money to the victim, that 
payment shows that the victim is someone who must be dealt with, 
who cannot be ignored with a flick of the hand. This is the kind of 
justice instantiated in the state constitutions that mention a right to 
redress, and discussed by tort scholars as civil recourse theory—the 
right to confront one who has wronged you. The payment of damages 
can be seen as settling a moral debt, or making amends.285 
This is a different kind of justice than the distributive justice 
implicated by social insurance. Social insurance is at root a way of 
achieving greater equality of misfortune or, put differently, a way of 
evening out, or cushioning people from, the burden of risk.286 For 
example, when Congress created a vaccine-compensation program,287 
it achieved this kind of justice by ensuring a “cushion” of sorts for 
individuals who happen to have the misfortune of taking particular 
vaccines at a particular point in time. 
But the Court too often seems to assume this kind of distributive 
justice is at issue, rather than individual or corrective justice (or the 
state interest in redress).288 Snyder claimed that Phelps had harmed 
him in a particular way—by knowingly acting and, yes, speaking in 
such a way as to cause him severe emotional harm—and that Phelps 
had thereby treated him as less than human. To use the familiar 
Kantian terms, Phelps treated Snyder as a means to another’s end. 
Snyder’s ceremonial grieving was simply a backdrop for Phelps’s 
main event, speaking to the world about the moral rot that he 
believed existed in the United States. And so for a court to order the 
 
 284. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 586–89 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th 
Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).  
 285. See Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 65, at 83–84 (“The idea of 
recourse is arguably in the same conceptual family as the retributive notion of an eye for an eye, 
and an idea of recourse lies behind the conviction that I may hit someone who hits me, that I 
may take back stolen property, that I may lash out with bitter words at one who has acted 
cruelly towards me. The same principle supports the notion that a person is entitled, as a matter 
of justice, to redress a wrong done to her.”). 
 286. See Robert E. Goodin, Compensation and Redistribution, in COMPENSATORY JUSTICE, 
supra note 276, at 143, 143–77. 
 287. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 (2006). 
 288. See supra Part.III.C.2. 
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payment of damages, or compensation, is to “restore[] equality,” to 
use Aristotle’s term, between the two men, both of equal dignity and 
moral worth.289 
Compensation has always been about justice.290 Indeed, the duty 
to pay damages—compensation—is the fundamental act of “repair” 
in corrective justice theory.291 And though compensation as social 
insurance may implicate distributive justice—that the victims not bear 
an undue burden of the costs of particular kinds of accidents—it does 
not further the kind of accountability or interpersonal justice that 
private law allows.292 By viewing compensation as social insurance or a 
pricing mechanism, the Court furthers the notion of private law as 
regulation, keeping concepts like wrongs and redress out of the 
picture. 
IV.  NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF RECAPTURING PRIVATE LAW 
We have now seen how the evolution of First Amendment 
doctrine, the unitary nature of the state-action doctrine, and the 
influence of instrumentalist thinking have combined to shape the 
Court’s view of the role of private law. Having unpacked these 
factors, the question then becomes how this ought to affect doctrine. 
Here, we are cautious. Our observations in Part III on the factors that 
have shaped the Court’s theory of private law are not the kind to lead 
to wholesale doctrinal revamping. For the most part, our prescription 
is for greater caution in determining the interests at stake when 
private law is at issue. 
Nonetheless, we present some prescriptive or normative ideas 
here in Part IV. Our ideas come from thinking about these issues in 
the First Amendment context, but some may apply more broadly to 
how the Supreme Court ought to treat private law and the state 
interest in providing redress or access to courts for individuals in a 
variety of contexts. 
 
 289. ARISTOTLE, supra note 281, at 125–27. 
 290. See MILLER, supra note 277, at 4 (“[J]ustice is a matter of restoring balance, achieving 
equity, determining equivalence, making reparations, paying debts, taking revenge—all matters 
of getting back to zero, to even.”).  
 291. See COLEMAN, supra note 58, at 329–60, 437–38; WEINRIB, supra note 59, at 56–58 
(describing corrective justice as a self-contained practice in which those who behave wrongfully 
discharge their duty of repair by compensating those they have harmed). 
 292. See Jason M. Solomon, What Is Civil Justice?, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 329 (2010) 
(“[C]ivil justice is a legal regime that responds to wrongdoing by vindicating the right of the 
victim to hold the wrongdoer accountable.”). 
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The payoff of the prior discussion can be boiled down to three 
prescriptive points, directed toward the Supreme Court: (1) because 
private law has value that is not reducible to regulation, consider 
placing further limits on the speech torts without shutting them off 
entirely; (2) take a careful look at state interests, including things like 
providing citizens with a right to redress; and (3) recognize that the 
identity of the plaintiff matters generally and specifically in 
understanding the value of the litigation at issue. 
A. Tinker with Speech Torts, But Do Not Shut Them Off Entirely 
In Sullivan, the Court dealt with the conflict over First 
Amendment values by creating a fault requirement for the state of 
mind of the defendant—“actual malice”—in order for the plaintiff to 
recover.293 But there were several other roads not taken that could be 
explored anew. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Snyder seems to 
indicate that if the First Amendment applies, then it automatically 
trumps.294 There would be no liability at all. But Justice Breyer’s 
approach in his concurring opinion that called for a more nuanced 
assessment of First Amendment interests in light of the state interest 
is perfectly plausible.295 
Moreover, in a case like Snyder, it might be that only actual 
damages are warranted.296 If the concern is that verdicts like this 
would put too high a price on speech, then this could serve to lower 
the price considerably. In this way, an individual like Snyder could 
still get redress by being able to confront in court the individual who 
had wronged him.297 
Perhaps, though, one could say that no lawyer would take such a 
case if there were only actual damages available, and that, therefore, 
the ability to get into court at all is illusory. One might also ask: If not 
a serious damages award, what would the remedy be? Here, though, 
 
 293. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). 
 294. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (“Whether the First Amendment 
prohibits holding Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech 
is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case.”). 
 295. Id. at 1221–22 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 296. See Epstein, supra note 123 at 793–94 (suggesting that limiting an award to actual 
damages was a road that the Sullivan Court could have taken). 
 297. See id. at 791 (arguing that the presumption “should be in favor of the constitutional 
permissibility of the common law rules”); Timothy Zick, “Duty-Defining Power” and the First 
Amendment’s Civil Domain, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 116, 120 (2009) (pointing out that 
Sullivan’s constitutionalizing of the common law was an “anomaly”). 
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it may well be that the ability to demand answers and confront 
another is a value in itself,298 and also alternative remedies such as 
court-ordered apologies or some form of restorative justice might also 
serve that state interest in redress just as well or better.299 
One thing, though, is clear: As a mechanism for providing 
redress, private law is not something that is easily replicated by other 
avenues, particularly in the case of private-figure plaintiffs like 
Snyder. This inquiry about available redress, though, has been 
entirely absent due to the Court’s imputing regulatory motive to the 
state.300 Closer attention to the state interest in redress, we believe, 
would lead to greater efforts to allow some measure of redress, while 
still protecting First Amendment values. 
B. Take a Considered Look at State Interests and State Level of 
Involvement 
Second, the Court ought to take a considered look at state 
interests, and not automatically assume that the regulation of primary 
activity is what the state is after.301 In order to do this, the court will 
have to understand the common law as embodying rights of various 
kinds, including the right to redress.302 And the Court will have to be 
comfortable with the fact that the common law contains no purpose 
section, as statutes passed by state legislatures frequently do.303 
Nonetheless, the history of the common law, the practice in states, 
and the presence of rights of redress in state constitutions are all 
indicia that this interest is something that matters to states. 
 
 298. Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L. REV. 67, 
73–74 (2010). 
 299. See Solomon, supra note 242, at 266–67 (“We can also think of a hypothetical civil 
justice system where apologies are the most common remedy, as opposed to money damages.”). 
 300. See Zipursky, supra note 179, at 519 (“The question is not whether the state may 
regulate or prohibit this type of speech. It is whether the state may permit accountability and 
individual recovery when one person has emotionally harmed another under such 
circumstances.”). 
 301. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balancing Significant Interests, 45 HASTINGS 
L.J. 825, 826 (1994) (arguing that government interests play an “immense, though often 
unarticulated role in constitutional adjudication” and are not subject to the same scrutiny as 
claims of constitutional rights).  
 302. See Goldberg, supra note 65, at 606–11 (making the case for such a right, in conjunction 
with historical and doctrinal evidence). 
 303. See Nelson, supra note 175, at 1855 (noting that modern courts “rarely hesitate” in 
considering legislative history and other information about the internal deliberations of 
legislatures when inquiring into governmental purpose).  
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There is also the question of how exactly to determine what the 
state interest is and who to listen to on the question. In Snyder’s case, 
he sued Phelps and the Westboro Baptist Church.304 All parties were 
private individuals and entities. The state of Maryland was nowhere 
in the picture. So when the Court was determining what the state 
interest was in the underlying law, there was no one representing the 
state to ask. 
By the time the case got to the Supreme Court, Maryland, along 
with several other states, had entered as amici. Their brief 
emphasized the importance of “protecting the sanctity and privacy of 
funerals,” as well as their interest in protecting “the emotional well-
being of grieving families through traditional tort law.”305 The state, 
then, appeared to also buy into the idea of tort law as regulation. But 
it is not clear how much weight ought to be given to the state’s 
assertions in litigation.306 Among the unusual dimensions of placing 
state interests at the center of the analysis is that it is not at all clear 
who gets to define those interests, or how.307 
In determining the state interest, though, a distinct doctrinal 
question—the threshold one of whether the state is sufficiently 
involved to trigger constitutional scrutiny at all (under the state action 
doctrine)—has the potential to mislead. As explained above, state-
action doctrine has become overly unitary.308 Either there is state 
action, or there is not. There is no in-between. So when there is state 
action, the state involvement is assumed to be regulatory. After all, 
that is what modern governments do. 
Many scholars have criticized the state-action doctrine, saying 
that it is outmoded and should be retired.309 Our view is somewhat 
different. To a certain extent, we think the public-private distinction 
that the state-action doctrine helps police should be stronger, not 
 
 304. See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th 
Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 305. Brief for the state of Kansas, 47 Other States, and the District of Columbia as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1–2, Snyder v. Phelps, 130 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (No. 09-751), 
2010 WL 2224733, at *1–2.  
 306. See Nelson, supra note 175, at 1789 (pointing out that judicial inquiries into legislators’ 
“true goals” are now “widely accepted” in American constitutional doctrine). 
 307. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but 
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 917–18 (1988) (pointing 
out that the literature has ignored the “validity of the process of inferring interests” and “the 
validity of the interests inferred”). 
 308. See supra note 203–204 and accompanying text. 
 309. See Metzger, supra note 189, at 1446–47 & n.275 (2003). 
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weaker. That is, we think more attention ought to be paid to the 
genuinely private aspect of private-law actions.310 
The issue, though, would not be whether the Constitution is 
implicated at all, as under the current unitary state-action doctrine. In 
our view, the extent to which the state is involved in the litigation has 
implications for the extent to which constitutional rights are at 
stake.311 If the state involvement consists of making available a 
common-law action and enforcing a jury verdict, then the 
constitutional concerns should be less significant than those raised in 
litigation involving a state statute, agency action, or direct action by 
government officials.312 In short, the degree and kind of state 
involvement ought to matter in determining the interests and values 
that prevail in a particular case. 
For example, at least seventeen states have statutes that forbid 
some kinds of false campaign speech, and the lower courts are split 
about whether such laws are constitutional.313 Of course, speech in 
political campaigns is at the heart of First Amendment concerns, and 
the fact that it is a state statute means that the level of state 
involvement is relatively high compared to a tort action brought by a 
private citizen like Snyder. Because the state directive comes from 
legislators who have to face voters every few years, we ought to be 
suspicious of the governmental motive or purpose as well, more so 
than we need to be in the twice-removed-from-the-sovereign 
(plaintiff brings action, jury enforces) posture of Snyder. Here, the 
motive of the legislators may well be to suppress speech that is critical 
of incumbents like them—much closer to the facts and posture of 
Sullivan than Snyder. And so a court ought to give more First 
 
 310. Cf. Christian Turner, State Action Problems, 65 FLA. L. REV. 281, 284 (2013) (arguing 
that the “morass of the state action doctrine is almost entirely a product of conflicting intuitions 
concerning what is public . . . and what is private,” and also arguing for more attention, not less, 
to what exactly is public and what is private about the area of law at issue). 
 311. For a similar argument in the context of how to deal with privatization, see id. at 1431–
32, which criticizes the “all-or-nothing” approach to state action as a “very blunt instrument.”  
 312. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 721, 730 (1931) (extending this 
principle to judicial injunctions against speech in a 5–4 decision in part based on the ex post 
availability of private-law remedies such as defamation); Epstein, supra note 123, at 788 & n.14 
(pointing out that if one reads Blackstone, “one could easily conclude that freedom of press 
meant only that prior restraint by administrative officials was unconstitutional” (citing 4 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151)). 
 313. See Adam Liptak, Was That Twitter Blast False, or Just Honest Hyperbole?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, at A12 (mentioning a pending certiorari petition challenging a Minnesota 
law of this kind). 
OMAN & SOLOMON IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2013  12:15 PM 
1166 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1109 
Amendment protection to the defendant in such a case, relative to the 
defendants in Snyder. 
C. The Identity of the Plaintiff and the Purpose of the Litigation 
Matter 
Finally the identity of the plaintiff and the point of the litigation 
ought to be taken into account. In a case like Snyder, the fact that the 
plaintiff is an individual, not a state, matters. It matters because one 
reason we give individuals access to the courts is to underscore their 
moral and political agency. And it ought to matter for First 
Amendment doctrine in a few ways. 
First, the public or private status of the plaintiff ought to remain 
a central part of First Amendment doctrine when evaluating the 
viability of speech torts. In Snyder, the Court ignored this central 
issue—whether the identity of the plaintiff ought to matter to the 
level of First Amendment protection accorded the speech.314 Using 
this doctrinal divide in intentional infliction of emotional distress 
cases—as well as in privacy and defamation cases where it is well 
established—is truer to the real interests at stake. The entitlement to 
redress for a public figure ought to be less because of the decision to 
be in the public eye.315 
In Snyder, the Court confronted a situation similar to that in 
Hustler with one important difference: neither Al Snyder nor his dead 
son was a public figure. Unlike Jerry Falwell, they had not placed 
themselves before the public as participants in public affairs who can 
expect bare-knuckled political debate. Al Snyder didn’t ask for the 
Westboro Baptist Church to show up at his son’s funeral simply 
because his son was a Marine.316 Accordingly, the state interest is 
 
 314. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1221 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The Court 
holds that the First Amendment protects the picketing that occurred here, primarily because the 
picketing addressed matters of ‘public concern.’ While I agree . . . I do not believe that our First 
Amendment analysis can stop at that point.”); Jeffrey Shulman, Free Speech at What Cost?: 
Snyder v. Phelps and Speech-Based Tort Liability, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 313, 325–
26, 333–34 (criticizing the Fourth Circuit’s opinion and the Westboro Baptist Church lawyers for 
ignoring the status of the plaintiff). 
 315. But see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress Tort, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 300, 304 (arguing that the public/private figure 
distinction “bears only on the degree of culpability required to allow compensatory damages for 
the constitutionally valueless false statements of fact”). 
 316. The second and third sentences of Justice Alito’s dissent read: “Petitioner Albert 
Snyder is not a public figure. He is simply a parent whose son, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew 
Snyder, was killed in Iraq.” Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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stronger in providing redress against those who have wronged him by 
invading his privacy and inflicting emotional pain. By failing to 
recognize this dichotomy in Snyder, the Court further obscured the 
centrality of the plaintiff’s agency and interest in accountability 
through private law. 
To be sure, this distinction has been difficult to navigate in the 
defamation context, but in cases like Snyder’s—in which the plaintiff 
is a private figure, not a public one—there ought to be less First 
Amendment protection for the speaker. The majority opinion in 
Snyder looked exclusively at the content of the speech in deciding the 
amount of First Amendment protection it was given; because it was 
held to be a matter of public concern (itself debatable),317 it got full 
First Amendment protection.318 But the other side of the equation is 
what the state’s interest is in providing redress for this plaintiff. Put 
differently, the question is whether the plaintiff has the moral 
authority to complain about certain speech. When the plaintiff is a 
public figure of his or her own choosing, then courts in the 
defamation context will frequently deny liability on the ground that 
the plaintiff does not have a right to complain, having sought the 
spotlight.319 But if the plaintiff is a private citizen like Snyder, then he 
does have grounds to complain. 
In addition, the plaintiff’s identity matters because it provides a 
clue as to what the purpose of any particular lawsuit is—a key issue in 
First Amendment doctrine.320 Snyder’s interest was certainly not in 
speech suppression. It was in demanding accountability from 
someone who had harmed him at a particularly vulnerable time in his 
life. If the Supreme Court took a closer look at what was actually 
going on in the underlying litigation, instead of assuming that the 
plaintiff and the jury were acting as agents of state regulation, then 
the degree of First Amendment protection might not have been so 
absolute. 
 
 317. See id. at 1226 (“While commentary on the Catholic Church or the United States 
military constitutes speech on matters of public concern, speech regarding Matthew Snyder’s 
purely private conduct does not.”). 
 318. Id. at 1218 (majority opinion). 
 319. Solomon, Judging Plaintiffs, supra note 4, at 1767. 
 320. See supra notes 170–177 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
The core of the First Amendment prevents prior restraint of 
speech by government officials. That much we have known for a long 
time. It is only since Sullivan in 1964 that we have grappled with what 
limits exactly the First Amendment places on civil liability for speech 
ex post, as opposed to criminal punishment of speech ex post or 
restraint of speech ex ante. 
In this Article, we have shown just how much the First 
Amendment’s protections have been broadened from Sullivan, a case 
involving public officials using private law to suppress criticism of 
their conduct as public officials (the core of “matters of public 
concern”), to Snyder, a case involving a private citizen using private 
law to seek redress against a group of people who sought to hijack his 
son’s funeral for their own purposes. 
In our view, the disappearance of any distinction between public 
law and private law is a step too far, and has led constitutional 
doctrine astray. There is something missing in the view that started 
with Holmes in 1897 and is dominant at the Supreme Court in 2012. 
According to this approach, all areas of law are best seen through an 
instrumental lens, fundamentally as ways of promoting various public 
policies of the state. 
In Snyder, this approach has been taken too far. It is time to 
revisit ways to protect First Amendment values while also protecting 
the state interest in individuals being able to redress wrongs that were 
done to them. Words can wound. And when attacked, the Al Snyders 
of the future ought to have a civilized means for redeeming their 
honor and holding accountable those who have wronged them. Far 
from being a relic of the past, the right to civil recourse is a 
fundamental part of a modern society that aspires to social equality. It 
is a right worthy of state interest, and a right worthy of being 
preserved. 
 
